The Spatial Distribution of Housing-Related Ordinary Income Tax Benefits by Gyourko, Joseph & Sinai, Todd
University of Pennsylvania
ScholarlyCommons
Real Estate Papers Wharton Faculty Research
12-2003
The Spatial Distribution of Housing-Related
Ordinary Income Tax Benefits
Joseph Gyourko
University of Pennsylvania
Todd Sinai
University of Pennsylvania
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.upenn.edu/real-estate_papers
Part of the Economics Commons, and the Real Estate Commons
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. http://repository.upenn.edu/real-estate_papers/44
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Gyourko, J., & Sinai, T. (2003). The Spatial Distribution of Housing-Related Ordinary Income Tax Benefits. Real Estate Economics, 31
(4), 527-575. http://dx.doi.org/10.1046/j.1080-8620.2003.00076.x
The Spatial Distribution of Housing-Related Ordinary Income Tax
Benefits
Abstract
We estimate how tax subsidies to owner-occupied housing are distributed spatially across the United States
and find striking skewness. At the state level, the mean tax benefit per owned unit in 1990 ranged from $917 in
South Dakota to $10,718 in Hawaii. The dispersion is slightly greater when benefit flows are measured at the
metropolitan-area level. Even assuming the subsidies are funded in an income progressivity-neutral manner, a
relatively few metro areas, primarily in California and the New York–Boston corridor, are shown to gain
considerably while the vast majority of areas have relatively small gains or losses.
Disciplines
Economics | Real Estate
This journal article is available at ScholarlyCommons: http://repository.upenn.edu/real-estate_papers/44
  
 
 
THE SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSING-RELATED TAX BENEFITS 
IN THE UNITED STATES 
 
 
 
Joseph Gyourko 
The Wharton School 
University of Pennsylvania 
 
and  
 
Todd Sinai 
The Wharton School 
University of Pennsylvania 
and NBER 
 
 
 
February 2001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This research was supported by the Brookings Institution’s Center on Urban and Metropolitan Policy 
and the Research Sponsor Program of the Zell/Lurie Real Estate Center at The Wharton School, 
University of Pennsylvania.  Seminar participants at the Brookings Institution and the Wharton School 
provided helpful suggestions.  In addition, Bill Dickens, Tony Downs, Bill Gale, and James Poterba 
provided thoughtful comments.  Finally, we thank Kiwan Lee for providing excellent research assistance 
and Paul Amos for the GIS plots. 
 
Ó 2001 by Todd Sinai and Joseph Gyourko.  All rights reserved.  Short sections of text, not to exceed 
two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including Ó notice, 
is given to the source. 
The Spatial Distribution of Housing-Related Tax Benefits in the United States 
Joseph Gyourko and Todd Sinai 
February 2001 
JEL No. H20, R38 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Using 1990 Census tract-level data, we estimate how tax subsidies to owner-occupied housing 
are distributed spatially across the United States, calculating their value as the difference in taxes 
currently paid by home owners and the taxes owners would pay if there were no preference for 
investing in one’s home relative to other assets.  The $164 billion national tax subsidy is highly skewed 
spatially with a few areas receiving large subsidies and most areas receiving small ones.  If the program 
were self-financed on a lump sum basis, less than 20 percent of states and 10 percent of metropolitan 
areas would have net positive subsidies.  These few metropolitan areas are situated almost exclusively 
along the California coast and in the Northeast from Washington, DC to Boston.  At the state level, 
California stands out because it receives 25 percent of the national aggregate subsidy flow while being 
home to only 10 percent of the country’s owners. At the metropolitan area level, owners in just three 
large CMSAs receive over 75 percent of all positive net benefits.  And within a number of the larger 
metropolitan areas, the top quarter of owners receives 70 percent or more of the total subsidy flowing 
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Introduction 
With 65 percent of U.S. households owning their own homes at a given point in time and a 
higher percentage owning a house at some point during their lifetimes, the tax treatment of owner-
occupied housing is one aspect of the tax code that affects many people’s daily lives.  It is not surprising 
that it is well studied in many aspects.  The mortgage interest and property tax deductions, in 
conjunction with the non-taxation of imputed rent, reduce the cost of owner-occupied housing relative 
to other investments [Hendershott and Slemrod (1983), Poterba (1984)], encourage home ownership 
and higher housing consumption [Rosen (1979), King (1980), Henderson and Ioannides (1989)], and 
perhaps even lead to overinvestment in the asset class [Mills (1987), Feldstein (1987)].  The subsidy 
may raise house prices [Capozza, Green, and Hendershott (1996), Bruce and Holtz-Eakin (1998), 
Sinai (1998)] and encourage suburbanization [Gyourko and Voith (2000)].  The tax treatment of 
owner-occupied housing also favors high-income people or those who own expensive houses [Poterba 
(1992)], and its potentially substantial contribution to families’ net worth has proven to be a political 
sticking point to eliminating it in any flat tax proposal. 
Despite the considerable attention paid to the tax treatment of owner-occupied housing, little is 
known about the geographical distribution of this subsidy.  However, since housing markets are 
inextricably tied to a physical location, knowing how the tax subsidy varies spatially is important to 
determining the effects of a change in the tax code.  At the least, it is important to consider the extent to 
which some areas of the country receive a greater share of the annual flow of tax code-related benefits 
to owner-occupied housing, both to see if resources are flowing from some locations to others and to 
determine if some areas might be more sensitive to a policy change.  In addition, the spatial distribution 
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may provide some insight into the political economy of changing that tax provision. 
In this paper, we take a first step in answering the larger question of what the economic impact 
of changing the tax treatment of owner-occupied housing would be by documenting where the tax 
benefits flow spatially, both within and across states and within and across metropolitan areas.  We 
calculate the value of the tax subsidy to owner-occupied housing as the difference in taxes currently paid 
by home owners and the taxes they would pay if the tax code treated them like landlords.  Unlike the 
current code, such tax treatment would not provide a preference for investing in one’s home relative to 
other assets. 
While our focus is on how much the tax subsidy to owner-occupied housing would decline in 
some areas relative to others if neutral taxation of owner-occupied housing were introduced, we also 
discuss the possible ranges and magnitudes of the effect on house prices or user costs of owning.  
However, we do not measure the redistributive effects of other tax benefits, tax expenditures, or the 
progressive income tax.  While these other aspects of the tax code are certain to redistribute income 
spatially in ways that may offset or augment the effects of the tax subsidy to home ownership measured 
here, we believe it is most appropriate to view the effects of each feature of the tax code in isolation.  
We also do not consider general equilibrium effects associated with the possibility that reducing the 
subsidy to owner-occupied housing may lead to a decline in house values.  This outcome would reduce 
the tax subsidy to owner-occupied housing further since the opportunity cost of equity would be lower.   
Using 1990 Census tract-level data, we estimate the tax subsidy to owner-occupied housing for 
the nation as a whole to be quite large, almost $164 billion in 1989, corresponding to $2,802 per home 
owner and $1,815 per household.  The bulk of the subsidy’s current benefits flow to a relatively few 
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owners.  For example, the census tracts containing the top 10 percent of the country’s owners in terms 
of subsidy flows receive 34 percent of the aggregate gross subsidy and the top half of owners receive 
nearly 80 percent.   
The subsidy also turns out to be highly skewed spatially.  In only 12 cases does a state’s share 
of the aggregate subsidy exceed its share of the nation’s owner-occupied housing units.  California alone 
reaps $41.5 billion, or 25 percent, of the gross benefits under the program while being home to only 10 
percent of the owner-occupied units in the country.  The program also effectively transfers just over $18 
billion from census tracts in cities to those outside cities.  This aggregate result is driven by a relatively 
few states, including California, New Jersey, New York, Massachusetts, and Connecticut, where the 
suburbs reap much greater tax benefits than the state’s cities.  In over half the states, the imbalance tilts 
in the other direction, with city tracts having larger tax benefits than suburban tracts, although the 
disparity in these states is smaller. 
Spatial variation and skewness becomes even more apparent when we analyze benefits across 
metropolitan areas.  Only ten percent of metropolitan areas receive more than the national average 
subsidy per owner-occupier.  Most of these areas lie along the California coast and Amtrak’s Northeast 
Corridor running from Washington, DC, to Boston, MA.  Even among this small group of areas, benefit 
flows are highly concentrated.  When program costs are accounted for by assuming the program is self-
financed via lump sum payments made by each household, we find that owners in just three large 
Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Areas (CMSAs) – Los Angeles-Riverside-Orange County, New 
York-Northern New Jersey, and San Francisco-Oakland-San Jose – receive just over 75 percent of all 
positive net benefit flows measured at the metropolitan area level. 
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The spatial distribution of benefits within metropolitan areas can be skewed as well, although 
this varies considerably across areas.  In many metropolitan areas, especially the smaller ones away 
from the two coasts, benefits tend to be relatively evenly distributed across owners.  In contrast, in a 
number of the larger metropolitan areas, the top quarter of owners receives 70 percent or more of the 
total subsidy flowing to the area.  The intra-metropolitan area spatial distribution of benefits also differs 
considerably across areas.  In some places such as the Philadelphia-Wilmington-Atlantic City CMSA, 
the tracts receiving the highest benefit flows tend to be concentrated in a relatively few, almost 
exclusively suburban jurisdictions.  In other areas, such as the Los Angeles-Riverside-Orange County 
CMSA, the top subsidy recipient tracts are more widely distributed across the region, with a good 
number within the city of Los Angeles itself. 
The economic implications of these results for any change in the current tax code depend upon 
whether or not the subsidy is capitalized into land prices.  If it is fully capitalized, eliminating the subsidy 
will not affect the user cost of owning, but there would be significant wealth effects for many owners.  
Back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that the perpetuity value of the subsidy amounts to about a 
fifth of property value on average in the United States.  While we presume the savings associated with 
eliminating the subsidy would be redistributed in lump-sum fashion, the net wealth effect still is likely to 
be significant in many areas.  For example, there are twenty metropolitan areas, including many densely 
populated ones centered around Boston, New York City, Washington, D.C., Los Angeles, and San 
Francisco, for which the present value of the subsidy flow is greater than 25 percent of house values.   
If the elimination of the tax subsidy is not capitalized into land prices, the user cost of ownership 
must rise.  Our calculations suggest that the increase would amount to between 3 and 5 percent of 
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annual household income in about three-quarters of the nation’s metropolitan areas.  However, in about 
10 percent of metropolitan areas, including many in California, Hawaii, and Massachusetts, the rise in 
user costs would amount to 10 percent of income or more.  On the other hand, our analysis indicates 
that returning the savings from eliminating the subsidy as a lump-sum refundable credit would more than 
offset the user cost increase in most areas, even assuming households do not reduce their housing 
consumption in response.  
Finally, it is noteworthy that our findings are not simply a reflection of the progressivity of the tax 
code.  One would expect benefits to be skewed towards high income households under a progressive 
rate structure, and if these households live close to each other that could account for the spatial patterns 
we identify.  However, high income, high tax bracket owners tend to reside in disproportionately 
valuable homes so that the tax code is interacting with housing consumption to provide an extremely 
skewed subsidy distribution.  Stated differently, while high income owners certainly do pay a large share 
of taxes, they receive an even larger share of this program’s benefit flows.   
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.  In the first section, we describe the tax 
subsidy to owner-occupied housing and how we measure it.  Section two reports our results, beginning 
with an analysis of how this tax program redistributes income across states and moving through 
progressively smaller geographies before concluding with a description of the spatial distribution of the 
tax benefits within some example metropolitan areas.  Section three then considers the economic 
implications of our findings in terms of potential capitalization and/or user cost effects.  Section four 
provides an analysis of the factors generating the spatial effects that we identify.  Finally, there is a brief 
conclusion and summary.   
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I. Measuring Housing-Related Tax Benefits 
Determining the Subsidy Under the Current System 
In a perfect housing asset market, the marginal home owner will invest in owner-occupied 
housing until the point where the annual cost she incurs exactly equals the rent she would have to pay as 
a tenant in the same property [Hendershott and Slemrod (1983), Poterba (1984)].  That user cost is 
described in equation (1) and takes into account the fact that implicit rental income is untaxed while 
mortgage interest and property taxes are deductible for itemizers:  
(1) RH = (1-tded)ai + (1-tded)tp + (1-tint)(1-a)r + M + d - PH.  
The left-hand side variable, RH, is the implicit rent per dollar of housing value the owner pays herself.  In 
equilibrium, it must equal the cost of owner occupancy per dollar of housing value.  These costs include: 
(a) the after-tax cost of mortgage interest, (1-tded)ai, where a is the loan-to-value ratio on the house,  i 
is the mortgage interest rate, and tded is the owner-occupier’s marginal tax rate which equals her 
marginal rate (denoted tint) if she itemizes and equals zero otherwise; (b) the after-tax cost of property 
tax payments, (1-tded)tp, with tp the effective property tax rate; (c) the after-tax opportunity cost of 
investing equity in the house rather than in some other investment at rate of return, r; this is given by (1-
tint)(1-a)r and is a cost to all owners, whether they itemize or not;1 (d) annual maintenance costs per 
unit of housing which are given by M; (e) the cost of true economic depreciation per unit of house which 
is assumed to occur at rate d; and (f) any annual appreciation in the house value, PH, which reduces the 
                                                                 
1This notation assumes that the opportunity cost of tying up equity in a house is foregoing taxable returns. 
 If the home owner were to invest in a tax-exempt asset instead, we assume the return would be (1-J)r rather than r, 
yielding the same after-tax return.  To the extent that the home owner has a lower tax rate than the marginal investor in 
municipal bonds, her opportunity cost of equity would be less than (1-J)r. 
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carry cost.2 
The components of the subsidy to owner-occupied housing can be highlighted by comparing the 
current tax treatment to that under a different tax code which does not favor owner-occupied housing.  
Treating the home owner like a landlord, for example, taxes the house like any other asset.  Since the 
home owner essentially rents her house to herself for RH, neutral tax treatment would require taxing the 
implicit rental income on one’s home.  If treated like landlords, owner occupiers also would be able to 
deduct maintenance expenses and depreciation in addition to the mortgage interest and local property 
taxes presently allowed.  Making these adjustments (and assuming accrual taxation on capital gains for 
clarity of exposition) would yield a different perfectly competitive equilibrium rent given in equation (2): 
(2) RH’= (1-t)ai + (1-t)tp + (1-t)(1-a)r + t RH’ + (1-t)M + (1-t)d - (1-t)PH. 
where tRH’ is the tax due on imputed rent.  Grouping the RH’ terms and dividing both sides by (1-t), we 
obtain: 
(3) RH’ = ai + tp + (1-a)r + M + d - PH . 
 Comparing equations (1) and (2) demonstrates that three factors determine the differences in 
the user costs under the two tax systems.  User costs of owning would be higher by the value of the 
untaxed imputed rent if tax neutrality were imposed, but the difference would be reduced by the values 
of the maintenance and depreciation deductions.  More formally, the difference in user costs under the 
two tax regimes, RH’- RH, represents the subsidy to owner occupancy under the current code and is 
                                                                 
2This specification treats capital gains on housing as untaxed and realized every year.  Given that there now 
is a $250,000 capital gains exclusion ($500,000 for married couples filing jointly) that can be applied every other year, 
this is not unrealistic.  Even in 1989, the assumption of no capital gains taxation on housing was valid for the vast 
majority of households. 
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captured in equation (4): 
(4) RH’-RH = tdedai + tded(tp) + tint(1-a)r. 
This equation measures the change in user costs, or implicit rent for owner-occupiers, that would result 
if the current tax system were modified so that one dollar of investment in owner-occupied housing was 
not favored over other assets.3  This is the tax subsidy to owner-occupied housing and it can be 
decomposed into three factors: (a) the tax value of home mortgage interest deductions (tded*a*i); (b) 
the tax value of  local property tax deductions (tded*tp); and (c) the tax that would have been paid on 
the equity invested in the home had it been invested elsewhere (tint*(1-a)*r).  By estimating these 
components, we can determine the total subsidy to owner-occupied housing under the current tax 
code.4 
Data and Estimation Strategy 
 Census tract level information in the STF3 files of the 1990 decennial census for all fifty states 
plus the District of Columbia are our primary data.  We use census data rather than tax return data 
because the census reports geocodes down to the tract level while we can only obtain state identifiers 
with the tax data.  Tract codes enable us not only to identify center city versus suburban areas, but to 
identify specific communities in the suburbs. The added location detail is critical when examining finer 
                                                                 
3We have conveniently abstracted from how many housing dollars on which a home owning family receives 
a subsidy.  A change in the tax treatment of owner-occupied housing might affect house values.  Since we measure 
the subsidy on a per dollar basis, we exclude the possibility that there is a second order effect through changes  in 
house prices.  This is done for two reasons.  First, as noted in the Introduction, determining exactly how a change in 
the subsidy would be capitalized into house values is beyond the scope of this paper.  Second, any change in house 
price would only increase the magnitudes of our estimates.  For example, if the benefit to owner-occupied housing 
were reduced, house prices might also fall, further decreasing the subsidy.  
4We do not intend to imply that the mortgage interest or local property tax deductions themselves create 
subsidies to owner occupiers.  The subsidy arises from the non-taxation of imputed rent in conjunction with those 
deductions.  However, mathematically the subsidy can be represented by the three terms in equation (4).   
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spatial distributions within an individual metropolitan area.  And, the census data report most of the 
crucial elements – including the distributions of house value and family income, along with certain 
demographics – needed to compute reasonably accurate 
estimates of the tax benefit.5 
We start by computing the distribution of household income among home owners at the tract 
level.6   For each tract, we divide the household income distribution into deciles and assign the median 
income for each decile to all the households in that category.  Thus, the lowest-income one-tenth of the 
households are assumed to have an income equal to that of the fifth percentile for the tract, the next 
lowest-income tenth of the households are assigned an income equal to that of the 15th percentile for the 
tract, and so forth. 
We then map tract-level information on the distribution of house values to incomes by assigning 
to households in each decile of the income distribution the value corresponding to the same decile of the 
house value distribution.  For example, we assume that the household in the 5th percentile of the income 
distribution for the tract also owns the home in the 5th percentile of the housing price distribution for the 
                                                                 
5Another possible data source is the American Housing Survey (AHS).  Unlike the Census tract-level data, 
the AHS reports income and house value for individual houses.  Unfortunately, the national files of the AHS do not 
contain state-level identifiers and the metropolitan area files only label central city status, making the Survey a poor 
choice for our application. 
6All tax benefit figures reported in this paper are based on tract-level data that aggregates household income 
across its various sources.  Tract-level data also are available on seven components of income (wages and salary, 
interest and dividends, social security, public assistance, farm and non-farm self employment income, retirement 
income, and “other”).  Experimentation showed that our estimates of the value of tax benefits are not sensitive to 
whether aggregate or disaggregate income data are employed.  In both series, capital gains information is missing.  
Hence, the data almost certainly under report income at the upper end of the distribution.  We do not believe this is 
an especially serious problem for 1989 because the top tax bracket is reached before one gets too far up the income 
distribution.  Thus, we probably do not underestimate the tax bracket of most of the households for which income is 
most likely under-reported. 
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same tract.7 
We begin estimating the components of equation (4) with each tract-decile’s weighted average 
value of the mortgage interest deduction, computing the tax value as the difference in tax bills with and 
without it.  The mortgage interest deduction itself is defined as PH*a*i.  Leverage ratios, a, were 
allowed to vary by age based on data computed from the 1989 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF). 
 A weighted average leverage for each tract was computed based on the tract’s age distribution.8  The 
mortgage interest rate, i, was calculated by taking an average from the 1989 SCF, and that rate was 
equal to 9.84 percent. 
The tax value of the mortgage interest deduction can differ from mortgage interest paid times the 
marginal tax rate for three reasons.  First, only families that itemize on their tax returns receive any 
benefit on the margin from the deductibility of mortgage interest.  Also, only the excess of the mortgage 
interest deduction plus other itemized deductions over the standard deduction has value for a taxpayer.  
Therefore, we would only multiply the portion of mortgage interest in excess of the standard deduction 
(after itemizing all other non-housing related deductions first) by the tax rate.  Additionally, since the tax 
                                                                 
7This matching process presumes that owners and renters in a tract have identical income distributions.  
Fortunately, our results are robust to alternative assumptions.  For example, if we assume an extreme case in which all 
the owners in a tract have a higher income than any of the renters, and houses are matched to owners so that the 
highest income owner owns the highest value house, the next highest income owner occupies the next highest 
valued house, and so forth, none of our spatial results at the national, state, or metropolitan levels change in a 
material way. The spatial distributions are only slightly more skewed than those reported below in the text, though in 
this case, the estimated aggregate subsidy is about 25 percent higher.  This latter result is to be expected given that 
in this  matching scheme owners always have the highest tax rates in each tract since they have the highest incomes. 
8Loan-to-value ratios by age are as follows: 20-24 year olds – 53.6 percent; 25-29 year olds – 70.2 percent; 
30-34 year olds – 66.1 percent; 35-39 year olds – 54.7 percent; 40-44 year olds – 48.9 percent; 45-49 year olds – 41.5 
percent; 50-54 year olds – 31.0 percent; 55-59 year olds – 24.0 percent; 60-64 year olds – 20.4 percent; 65-69 year olds 
– 10.3 percent; 70-74 year olds – 10.3 percent; and 75+ year olds – 2.4 percent.  In addition, our findings are not 
sensitive to assuming 35 percent leverage, the national average in 1989 according to American Housing Survey data, 
for all tracts. 
 11
schedule is nonlinear, taking the mortgage interest deduction may lower the taxpayer’s marginal and 
average tax rates. 
The actual value of the tax benefits also depends on certain demographic data that are likely to 
affect the number of exemptions and the overall amount of deductions.  Tract level data that are 
available include the distribution of whether households are single, married, or single with children; the 
percentage of households with children; and the percentage of households over 65 years of age. 
Unfortunately, the census data lack information on most non-housing categories of potential tax 
deductions.  We compute mortgage interest, state, and property tax deductions, but we do not observe 
medical expenses, charitable giving, deductible interest (other than for a home mortgage), and several 
other miscellaneous categories.  Charitable giving alone accounted for $55 billion of the $432 billion of 
total itemized deductions reported on tax returns in 1989, placing it behind only mortgage interest ($169 
billion) and state and local taxes ($81 billion).  Thus, these omissions potentially are severe.   
Two counterbalancing problems arise from underestimating possible deductions.  First, we 
would be more likely to incorrectly assume the family does not itemize.  This error would cause us to 
underestimate the tax value of the mortgage interest and property tax deductions since less would be 
deducted at the margin.  On the other hand, undercounting deductions for itemizers could increase the 
tax value we do measure since the remaining deductions are applied against higher marginal tax rates. 
Consequently, we impute missing tax deductions to our census data based on data from the 
Department of the Treasury’s Statistics of Income (SOI) public use tax micro sample.  A modified 
Heckman-style sample selection model is employed to correct for the selective observing of deductions 
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only by itemizers, with the details reported in the appendix.9  Following this imputation, federal and state 
tax rates and implied tax benefit amounts are computed using the National Bureau of Economic 
Research’s (NBER) TaxSim program. 
The second component of equation (4) involves the value of the deduction of local property 
taxes.  Property tax payments themselves are defined as PH*tp, where tp is the average effective 
property tax rate.  This is allowed to vary by state using data from the Advisory Commission on 
Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR (1987)).10  The tax value of the deduction associated with these tax 
payments then is computed the same way as for the mortgage interest deduction.   
The last component in equation (4) arises from the fact that the government does not tax as 
income the implicit return on equity an owner invests in the home.  Precisely what home owners would 
have done with their money had they not purchased a home cannot be known with certainty, of course. 
 We assume that for most owners the alternative is a relatively safe investment with a duration similar to 
mortgages.  Consequently, we use the 8.71 percent yield on seven year Treasuries in 1989 to represent 
the foregone interest that could have been earned on home equity.11 
                                                                 
9The imputation results indicate that underestimation of deductions and therefore underestimation of 
itemizers was the biggest problem associated with sample selection.  This turns out to be important because the 
underestimation of itemizers was not random across space.  In high house value and high income tax states such as 
California, not observing non-housing deductions only infrequently caused us to miscategorize an owner family as a 
non-itemizer.  Home mortgage interest, local property taxes, and state income taxes generally were sufficient to make 
California residents itemizers.  This was not the case in many states with lower house values and lower state taxes.  
Hence, the imputation has an important effect on the measured spatial distribution of program benefits. 
10 The ACIR did not report state-by-state breakdowns for 1989, so we use the 1987 data.  We have also 
experimented with assuming a 1 percent and 1.5 percent national average effective rate.  Our findings are not 
sensitive to these changes. 
 
11One extreme would be to assume that the equity portion of the house value would have been put under 
the home owner’s mattress, earning a zero nominal return.  In that case, user costs are lower under the current tax 
code only because of the value associated with mortgage interest and local property tax deductions. 
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The value of the non-taxation of the return on equity invested in housing is computed in two 
steps.  First, we calculate the opportunity cost of the equity in one’s home, or PH*(1-a)*r, where r is 
the 8.71 percent Treasury yield.  We then calculate the difference in tax liabilities between the cases in 
which the family invested the home equity in taxable form and in which they held untaxed housing.  This 
approach accounts for the possibility that a family might move into a higher marginal tax bracket if the 
return on its housing equity was taxed. 
The procedure for estimating equation (4) is represented graphically in Figure 1 which shows a 
tax schedule with three marginal tax brackets.  A home-owning family with no housing-related 
deductions would have a taxable income (TI) of Y1.  However, if they were not owners, they may have 
invested their housing equity in a vehicle that yielded a taxable return which would raise their TI to Y2.  
Thus, Y2 is the counterfactual TI for a home-owning family if it were to stop being an owner.  Starting 
with that TI, we can compute the tax value of each of the three aforementioned deductions.  With an 
taxable income of Y2, this hypothetical family would have a tax liability of T1.  Assume that claiming the 
home mortgage interest deduction (HMI) would lower TI to Y2-HMI (presuming for simplicity that all 
of HMI was above the standard deduction) and the tax liability to T2.  Therefore, the tax savings for this 
family from the mortgage interest deduction is T1-T2. 
Although in this example the mortgage interest deduction does not move the family into a lower 
tax bracket, the property tax deduction does.  Beginning with TI equal to Y2-HMI, we can compute the 
tax savings from the property tax deduction as the tax bill with only the mortgage interest deduction, T2, 
minus the tax bill with both the mortgage interest and property tax deductions, T3.  In this case, T2 and 
T3 span a kink in the tax schedule, but still account for the fact that the average tax rate is less than the 
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marginal tax rate at Y2-HMI. 
Finally, we compute the value of the non-taxation of the return on housing equity.  Because the 
return on housing equity is not included in TI, taxable income is measured at Y1 instead of the greater 
amount Y2.  The tax value of not including that income is measured as the change in tax between T3 (the 
tax bill corresponding to an TI of Y2-HMI-Tp) and T4 (the tax bill corresponding to an TI of Y1-HMI-
Tp).  If there is no opportunity cost for the housing equity, Y1=Y2 and the tax savings is zero. 
It is apparent from Figure 1 that the order in which the deductions are taken matters when the 
tax schedule is not linear.  For example, T1-T2 > T3-T4, even though HMI < Y1-Y2.  After adding back 
the implicit return on housing equity, we compute the deductions in the following order: (a) tax savings 
from the mortgage interest deduction; (b) the tax savings associated with the property tax deduction; 
and (c) the savings from the return on housing equity being untaxed.  We have repeated the estimation 
using all six possible sequences in which the deductions can be taken.  While the relative magnitudes of 
the categories do change, the differences are minor. 
 
II. Results 
Summary Statistics 
There were 90.2 million households in the nation in 1989, with over 61 million residing outside 
of central cities.12  The propensity to own is high, with 58.4 million or 64 percent of all households being 
owner-occupiers – 71 percent of those living outside of central cities and 50 percent of households 
living inside of central cities. 
                                                                 
12This calculation is made based on central city designations of the Office of Management and Budget. 
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Overall, those owners receive a substantial tax subsidy.  Table 1 reports aggregate, per owner-
occupied housing unit, and per household values of the aggregate tax benefit for the U.S. The gross 
value to owners of all housing-related tax benefits for the country in 1989 was nearly $164 billion (top 
panel).  Of this total, 62 percent derives from the untaxed return on home equity.  Nearly $43 billion, or 
26 percent of total tax benefits, is due to mortgage interest.13  This fraction is lower than the 
approximately 35 percent of total house value that is debt financed because not all available mortgage 
interest deductions are in excess of the standard deduction.  The remaining $20 billion in housing-related 
tax benefits is generated from the deduction of local property taxes. 
This subsidy is sizeable, even on a per-household basis.  Gross program benefits per owner-
occupied housing unit are $2,802 (middle panel).  This figure results from dividing the $163.8 billion in 
aggregate benefits by the 58.4 million owned units nationally.  The $1,815 in tax benefits per household 
represents the cost per household needed to fund the program if it were self-financed.  Under that 
assumption, net benefits to owners on average are only $987 ($2,802-$1,815).  Renters suffer a net 
outflow in the amount of the $1,815 mean program cost since their tax treatment is the same under the 
current code and one that taxes owner-occupiers like landlords.14 
                                                                 
13Our $43 billion estimate of the value of mortgage interest deductions overstates the value based on 
computations using the SOI by about $6 billion.  One reason is that the SOI calculation will underestimate the true 
subsidy value since it does not add back foregone equity as income.  In addition, we suspect that some of the 
discrepancy is due to the fact that our deduction imputation procedure does not take account of the possibility that 
taxpayers who itemize tend to have deductions in multiple categories.  Hence, we probably underestimate the total 
amount of deductions and therefore apply a higher tax rate to housing deductions than we do with the SOI, where we 
observe each taxpayer’s actual deductions.  
14One might argue that the current code subsidizes renters because landlords are able to deduct various 
expenses and competition may force them to pass along some of the tax code-related benefit to their tenants.  
However, comparing the current tax system to our neutral one nets out any subsidy to renters.  Since the taxation of 
landlords is unchanged across the two tax systems, eliminating the subsidy for owner-occupiers will not affect 
renters, other than by saving them the $1,815 mean program cost.  The current code would subsidize renters if 
landlords are allowed to depreciate income properties for tax purposes faster than true economic depreciation – and 
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Figure 2 illustrates that the subsidy not only is large, but is far from uniformly distributed across 
owners.  This figure plots the cumulative gross aggregate subsidy against the cumulative percentage of 
owners in the nation.  The outward bow of the plot indicates the distribution of subsidy is skewed 
towards a relatively few owners.  For example, the top 10 percent of owners receive 34 percent of all 
aggregate benefits, the top 25 percent of owners receive 59 percent of the total subsidy, and the top 50 
percent of owners reap 80 percent of aggregate program benefit.15  While the subsidy clearly is skewed 
in aggregate, the remainder of this section focuses on whether the subsidy also is spatially skewed. 
State-Level Results 
 Table 2 presents data on gross and net program benefits at the state level.  The first column 
reports the value of total tax code-related benefits per owner-occupied housing unit for the fifty states 
and the District of Columbia.  There is wide variation around the $2,802 average value for the nation 
reported in Table 1.  The state means range from a low of $775 in South Dakota to $9,181 in Hawaii.  
The aggregate value of gross tax benefits in each state is reported in column 2.  This is the product of 
the per owner number in the first column and the number of owners in the state. 
One way of characterizing the state-to-state differences in benefits is by comparing the state’s 
share of the gross aggregate tax benefits to its share of the country’s owners.  Column 3 of Table 2 
reports this ratio.  Only 11 states plus the District of Columbia have subsidy ratios greater than one.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
if that were passed along to renters in the form of lower rent.  However, taxing owner-occupiers like landlords would 
not change the depreciation schedule and, therefore, would not affect the subsidy to renters.  We would 
overestimate the loss to owner-occupiers of “eliminating” their subsidy since it would be replaced by another one – 
accelerated depreciation.  However, while one could argue that the statutory depreciable life in 1981 (of 15 years) was 
shorter than true economic depreciation, the situation post-1986 is more akin to one in which economic depreciation 
is not very different from statutory depreciation. 
15Because our underlying data are at the tract level, we ranked tracts in order of gross subsidy flow and 
summed across the number of owners in those tracts. 
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California is a prime example, having 10 percent of the country’s owned units and receiving more than 
25 percent of the country’s aggregate tax code-related benefits to owners, for a subsidy ratio of 2.6.  
Hawaii has the highest subsidy ratio, with a tax benefit share of 1.1 percent but only 0.3 percent of 
owned units.  South Dakota has the lowest subsidy ratio, as its subsidy share is only one quarter that of 
its share of the nation’s home owners. 
These tax benefits have to be paid for in some way, and if we assume the program is self 
funding, the lump-sum cost per household must equal the $1,815 national average benefit per 
household.  Columns 4 and 5 of Table 2 present net benefit figures, per owned unit and in aggregate, 
respectively, with the net benefit per owned unit equaling the total tax benefit per owned unit from the 
first column less $1,815.  Figure 3 plots the numbers in column four, with states ordered from lowest to 
highest benefit level.  The negative values reported for 26 states indicate that the per household lump-
sum program cost exceeded the average tax benefit in these areas.  However, there is not much 
variation in the net negative benefits per owned unit among those states, and the biggest negative transfer 
states do not have large populations.  It also is clear from Figure 4 that the benefit to those states whose 
owners are net recipients is highly skewed, with home owners in Hawaii receiving much more benefit 
per household than owners in Pennsylvania, the state with the lowest positive net benefit.  
Aggregate net benefits to owners are reported in column five.  The overall benefit to a state as a 
whole must take into account the program costs paid by renters.  Renter household costs are reported 
in Column 6 and are based on the assumption that each renter household pays $1,815 to support the 
home ownership subsidy program.16  Hence, each number in Column 6 is negative. 
                                                                 
16The number of rental households is computed as the difference between the total number of households 
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Net program benefits in the state, which are the sum of net benefits to owners and renters, are 
reported in Column 7.  A positive number indicates the state receives a net transfer from other states 
under the program, assuming it is lump-sum financed.  There are only twelve states (including the District 
of Columbia) who are net recipients under the program once renter costs are taken into account.  Figure 
4 plots this state-level net transfer series and highlights how skewed the benefits are even among these 
dozen areas.  California is the biggest recipient in aggregate, receiving over $22 billion from the rest of 
the nation -- more than all the other net positive beneficiaries combined.  Even given California’s large 
population, this amounts to $2,211 per household and $3,953 per owner-occupied unit.  Owners in 
Hawaii receive much bigger transfers of $5,994 on average, but the smaller number of owners puts the 
state’s net benefit at only $1.1 billion.  To put these numbers in perspective, the mean annual benefit 
paid to poor families nationwide on AFDC in 1990 was $4,468 according to the 1998 Green Book 
Overview of Entitlement Programs. 
Texas clearly is the biggest loser on a statewide basis, suffering a negative net transfer of $6 
billion.  This amounts to $997 for each of the approximately six million households in the state.  Other 
large aggregate losers include the high population states of Florida, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Michigan.  
City-Suburban Results 
We can also compute the extent to which the program allocates resources to tracts in central 
cities versus those in outlying areas.  For ease of exposition, we refer to any census tract not in a central 
city as being in the suburbs.17  Differences in subsidy flows between city and suburban tracts are 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
reported in the census and the number of owned units. 
17We have performed the analysis restricting the data to tracts in metropolitan areas so as to cut down on 
the number of truly rural observations.  None of our findings are materially affected by this change in sample. 
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measured using the variable we term the Suburban-City Benefit Gap (SCGAP).  This is computed as 
follows for each census tract: 
(5)     SCGAP = (Aggregate Suburban Tax Benefit Value-Aggregate City Tax Benefit Value)  - 
            ($1,815 * [Suburban Households-City Households]) 
 
This is the difference in the value of aggregate tax benefits realized in each area, adjusted for the average 
program cost that each household is presumed to pay on a lump sum basis. 
Nationally there is a net transfer from central cities to suburbs, as center cities pay $18.2 billion 
more in lump-sum taxes than they get back in benefits.  However this aggregate result masks the fact, 
shown in figure 5, that in more than half the states the gap in benefits between cities and suburbs is 
reversed, with cities receiving more in benefits than their state’s suburbs. Of the states where central 
cities benefit more, California accounts for well over half of the aggregate difference in net tax benefits 
between center cities and suburbs, with other large gaps occurring in New Jersey, New York, 
Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Maryland.  In many more states, there are relatively small differences 
in net benefits between central cities and outlying tracts.  Only in a relatively few, primarily southern, 
states do city tracts benefit substantially more than non-city tracts.  
Between-Metropolitan Area Results 
Examining the distribution of subsidy across metropolitan areas further highlights how the spatial 
skewness of the program benefits increases as we move to more disaggregated geographies.  Table 3 
reports data analogous to that in Table 2, this time for metropolitan areas rather than states.  All 262 
metropolitan areas that were considered Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) or Consolidated 
Metropolitan Statistical Areas (CMSAs) in 1990 are included.  In addition, for each state, we 
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aggregated the census tracts that were not in government-defined MSAs or CMSAs and defined them 
as their own ‘area’ so that there are 312 total areas listed in the table.  For example, in Alaska these 
tracts are termed the ‘Non-MSA Alaska’ area.  Including the tracts in these areas allows us to see the 
distribution of subsidy inside and outside of metropolitan areas. 
The information in column three on the Subsidy Ratio provides the first indication that the 
subsidy distribution is even more skewed when measured at the metropolitan area level.  There are only 
30 metropolitan areas, or approximately 10 percent, with Subsidy Ratios in excess of one.  This 
compares to the 12 (or 20 percent of) states, including the District of Columbia, with ratios above one.  
Of the 30 areas, eight are in California, eight are in Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, or New 
Hampshire and centered around the Boston area, two are in Hawaii, with the others scattered across 
the country in large population centers such as New York City, Washington, Chicago, Seattle, 
Philadelphia, and Atlanta.  These 30 metropolitan areas are relatively populous, containing almost 30 
percent of the nation’s owner-occupied units.   
Even when one scales the data to look at benefits per owned unit, there is a consistent pattern 
of highly spatially skewed subsidies at the metropolitan area level.  A relatively small, but not minuscule, 
fraction of owners in a few areas are doing very well under the current tax code, with a host of owners 
in the vast majority of metropolitan areas having benefit flow levels fairly close to the mean program 
cost.  Figure 6 reports the value of net tax benefits per owned unit.  These data are from column four of 
Table 3 and net out the mean program cost of $1,815 from gross program benefits per owner.  Ninety 
of the 312 areas have positive net benefit values for owners and contain roughly half of all owners 
nationwide.  Focusing on those with gross benefits of at least $3,600, double the mean program cost, 
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finds 19 areas that meet the criterion.  There are over 12.3 million owners in these areas, which amounts 
to 21 percent of all owners throughout the nation.  
Figure 7’s plot of the aggregate net transfer data from column 7 of Table 3 highlights just how 
spatially concentrated are overall program benefits.  After netting out renter costs, only 28 of the 312 
metropolitan areas have positive aggregate net benefits.  Only five of these areas receive strictly more 
than $1 billion per year in net benefit (although Honolulu is very close).  Three CMSAs alone – San 
Francisco-Oakland-San Jose, Los Angeles-Riverside-Orange County, and New York City-New 
Jersey – receive $36.5 billion of the total $47.7 billion in positive net transfers nationwide.  These three 
CMSAs are densely populated, containing 14 percent of the nation’s owners and 16 percent of the 
nation’s households.  However, the figure makes clear just how tightly spatially targeted are program 
benefits across metropolitan areas.18 
Finally, Figure 8 presents a national picture of mean gross benefit levels per household for all 
262 government-designated metropolitan areas.  In this figure, the MSAs are divided into quartiles 
based on mean subsidy per household, with the top five percent of areas separately identified.  The 
darker the shading, the greater the subsidy per household.  This national plot highlights the fact that the 
largest subsidy recipients are concentrated in coastal California and along Amtrak’s Northeast Corridor 
running from Washington, DC, to Boston, MA.  Beyond these very high subsidy areas, there are 
virtually no above average subsidy areas in the interior of the country.  Nationally, the subsidy is 
disproportionately targeted spatially towards select areas of the east and west coasts. 
Within-Metropolitan Area Results 
                                                                 
18 Scaling net transfers by the number of households does reduce the skewness somewhat.  However, the 
bulk of areas still experience small to modest net negative benefit flows and very few areas receive large positive 
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 We now ask whether one sees the same kind of spatial skewness in the value of the housing 
subsidy when we focus within metropolitan areas.  It turns out that in some metropolitan areas the 
distribution of the housing subsidy is fairly equitable while in others, including many of the largest cities, a 
small portion of the population captures the bulk of the tax benefits.  Figure 9 reports plots of the 
cumulative aggregate subsidy against the cumulative percentage of owners for a small sample of 
metropolitan areas.  Analogous to Figure 2’s plot for the nation, these charts allow one to determine 
visually what share of the subsidy flow to an area is captured by any given fraction of owners in the 
region.  If the plot for a metropolitan area were the a straight line through the origin, then 25 percent of 
the owners in the area would receive 25 percent of the subsidy flowing to the area, 50 percent of the 
owners would receive half the subsidy, and so on.  The more outwardly bowed the plot, the more 
concentrated the region’s subsidy flow is among a relatively few owners.  The 45-degree line is plotted 
as a reference and the thick curved line is the actual cumulative distribution of subsidy in the MSA. 
Figure 9 shows stark differences across metropolitan areas.  While no region’s plot is a straight 
line, those for Appleton, WI, and Madison, WI, are closest.  In communities like these, the subsidy is 
not highly concentrated among a relatively few owners.  The picture is quite different in other 
metropolitan areas such as Atlanta, Chicago, Dallas, Houston, and Philadelphia.  In these areas, 
typically 70 percent or more of all subsidies flowing to the area accrue to no more than 25 percent of 
the owners in the metropolitan area.  Generally, the less populous metropolitan areas off the two coasts 
have the least skewed subsidy distributions.  Coastal areas and the more populous metropolitan areas 
tend to have more skewed distributions in the sense that a relatively few owners capture most of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
transfers. 
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benefits in the region. 
Although it is clear from Figure 9 that in some MSAs a small fraction of owners receive most of 
the benefit flows, we also wish to see whether these households tend to live together or are scattered 
throughout the metropolitan area.  That is, beyond the distributional inequities apparent in Figure 9, is 
there spatial skewness within MSAs?  Figures 10-15 address this question by mapping the housing 
subsidy per household in every tract for a small sample of six metropolitan areas. Akin to what was 
done in Figure 9, in each of these plots we divide tracts into quartiles based on subsidy per household 
and break out the top five percent of tracts separately.  The darker shading corresponds to greater 
subsidy per household, so the top five percent of tracts in the MSA have the darkest shading, the next 
20 percent is the next darkest, the next quartile has the mid-level of shading, and so forth for the 
remaining two quartiles.  The key in the lower left-hand corner of each plot identifies the actual dollar 
cutoffs for each group; note that the dollar amounts differ widely across metropolitan areas.19  
There are few generalizations one can make about the intra-metropolitan area spatial distribution 
of subsidies.  Typically, many of the lower-subsidy tracts in this sample of MSAs are clustered within 
the boundaries of the primary city, although in Los Angeles-Riverside-Orange County and Chicago-
Gary-Kenosha, that is not always the case.  Conversely, most the highest subsidy tracts in this particular 
sample are outside the city borders, although some cities have high-subsidy sections. 
Overall, the high-subsidy tracts are usually clumped together and there are smooth gradients 
from low-subsidy to high-subsidy areas.  In other words, we do not see very many ‘islands’ of 
                                                                 
19Because the tract land areas vary considerably due to differences in residential densities, the proportion of 
the map that will be each color will not be 25 percent (or 20 or 5 percent for the top two categories) even though the 
number of tracts is allocated properly. 
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especially high- or low-subsidy tracts.  In some areas, such as Madison, the highest subsidy tracts form 
one solid mass.  In Philadelphia, the top five percent of tracts receive roughly the same amount of 
subsidy as the bottom 60 percent and most of those high-subsidy tracts are located along the so-called 
Main Line in suburban Montgomery County.   Atlanta is at the other end of the spectrum and has a 
fairly uniform distribution of high-subsidy tracts, although the highest subsidy tracts are concentrated 
north of the city.  In other areas such as New York-Northern New Jersey, the high-subsidy tracts are 
fairly evenly distributed throughout the MSA, although still clumped together. 
Benefit flows tend to be much less spatially concentrated within the smaller metropolitan areas 
such as Madison, although the higher-subsidy areas tend to ring the city, as they do in the Atlanta area.  
In the other cities, perhaps due to their proximity to large bodies of water, the high subsidy areas appear 
more distinct, such as in Chicago.  This also tends to be the case in Boston, Seattle, and San Francisco 
which are not reported here. 
 
III. Implications: Capitalization and User Costs 
The impact of any change in the tax treatment of owner-occupied housing on households 
depends upon the extent to which the subsidy is capitalized into prices.  In this section, we discuss two 
extreme cases -- the subsidy being fully capitalized into house prices and no capitalization whatsoever -- 
to illustrate the range of potential outcomes.   
 To help gauge how large these impacts might be, we created two variables for each tract in 
each metropolitan area.  CAPSUB provides an upper bound on the possible size of capitalization 
relative to property value and is defined as the ratio of the perpetuity value of the subsidy (PVSUB) to 
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tract average house value (AVGHV).  INCSUB represents how much user costs could change relative 
to income if there were no capitalization whatsoever and is computed as the ratio of the annual subsidy 
for 1989 (SUBSIDY) to tract average household income (AVGINC). 
The numerator of CAPSUB represents the present value of the annual tax subsidies assuming 
they are unchanged in perpetuity.  The perpetuity value for any tract i in metropolitan area j is defined as 
the 1989 subsidy value for the tract divided by the capitalization rate in the metropolitan area 
(CAPRATEj), which is defined as the rent to price ratio.20  Since rents equal user costs in equilibrium, 
we employ the user cost divided by house value for each tract as a proxy for the cap rate and take the 
owner-weighted mean across all tracts in the metropolitan area.21  The denominator of CAPSUB is the 
tract average house value.  Thus, 
(7) CAPSUBij = PVSUBij / AVGHVij = (SUBSIDYij/CAPRATEj)/AVGHVij 
where all variables are as defined above. 
Figure 16 plots the mean CAPSUB for each metropolitan area, from lowest to highest value.  In 
the typical metropolitan area, the capitalized value of the subsidy for a house in a typical census tract is 
around 20 percent of house value.   However, the standard deviation is about 6 percentage points and 
                                                                 
20The capitalization rate used here is based on a real estate concept meant to reflect the ratio of the net 
operating income on a property to its asset value. For those more familiar with financial multiples, it is akin to the 
inverse of the price-earnings ratio on a stock. 
21To better understand this, it is useful to rewrite Equation (1) more simply as USER COSTS=(1-t)SUBSIDY 
+ M + d - PH.  The variable SUBSIDY is computed for each tract as described in equation (4).  We use an average tax 
rate defined as subsidy per owner in the tract divided by the mean housing deductions in the tract to proxy for t.  
Values for maintenance, economic depreciation, and housing price inflation are taken from Poterba (1992).  These 
three measures are the same across all tracts, so that the variance in capitalization rates across metropolitan areas is 
due solely to the spatial variance in SUBSIDY values.  The mean capitalization rate across metropolitan areas is 9.7 
percent with a fairly tight interquartile range of 9.4-10.0 percent.  Ten percent of the areas have cap rates below 9.1 
percent, while another ten percent have cap rates above 10.2 percent.  Our examination found the variance to be 
sensible with the larger, more densely populated areas having the lower cap rates and the smaller and more rural areas 
tending to have the highest cap rates. 
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the interquartile range for the metropolitan area means is from 18-25 percent.  There are 20 
metropolitan areas in which the mean CAPSUB value is over 25 percent.  Included in this group are the 
MSAs or CMSAs centered around Boston, New York City, Washington, D.C., Los Angeles, and San 
Francisco, so the list contains some of the largest and most densely populated areas in the country.  
Values for individual metropolitan areas are reported in Appendix B. 
Figure 16 suggests that if the subsidy were fully capitalized and the tax benefits suddenly taken 
away, house prices in the typical area would fall by around 20 percent, with some places experiencing 
much larger declines and a few areas being less affected.  While this represents a decline in demand due 
to the substitution effect associated with the change in relative price of housing, there will be a 
countervailing income effect associated with the lump sum redistribution of the $1,815 per household 
savings from eliminating the subsidy.  The lump sum transfer makes it clear that renters will be better off 
if the tax subsidy to home ownership is eliminated.  The same will be the case for some owners, 
especially those who do not experience much of a reduction in house price in exchange for the stream of 
annual payments of $1,815.  Whether the trade-off is worth it for these owners depends upon other 
factors such as their expected investment horizons and their discount rates.  For owners in relatively high 
CAPSUB areas, the trade-off very likely will not be worth it. 
Because our measure incorporates no general equilibrium effects of a change in policy, precise 
estimates of the ultimate impacts are not possible.  However, our back-of-the-envelope measure 
strongly suggests that the wealth effects of eliminating the tax subsidy to owners, if fully capitalized, 
would be economically meaningful for the average area in America.  Research by Tracy et al (1999) 
shows that, even with the spread of stock ownership, housing wealth still constitutes virtually all of 
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household wealth for the typical owner household.  And, for those owners with leverage above 80 
percent, such as younger households or first-time homeowners, elimination of the subsidy could wipe 
out all home equity if the subsidy is capitalized, raising the specter of increased mortgage defaults [Kau 
et. al. (1992);  Deng, Quigley, and Van Order (1996)]. 
Our second measure, of the proportion of income saved due to the tax subsidy, is simply 
(8) INCSUBij = SUBSIDYij / AVGINCij.  
In this case, SUBSIDY and AVGINC values are available for each tract in each metropolitan area.  
Absent any capitalization of the subsidy or changes in interest rates, elimination of the tax benefits must 
lead to an increase in user costs.  Mean INCSUB values by metropolitan area are plotted in Figure 17. 
 In a typical area, the annual costs of owning would increase by about four percent of annual income. 
While three quarters of MSAs have mean INCSUB values of between 3-5 percent, in 10 MSAs the 
fraction would be more than 10 percent.22 
In this case, a cash lump sum transfer is presumed to be received each year to offset the higher 
cash user costs of ownership.  Creating a ‘net INCSUB’ measure in which the numerator of equation 
(8) is changed to equal ‘SUBSIDYij - $1,815’ finds that owners in the typical metropolitan area are 
better off from eliminating the tax subsidy if there is no capitalization and there is lump sum redistribution 
of the savings.  The median metropolitan area has a ‘net INCSUB’ value of -0.012, indicating that the 
lump sum transfer exceeds the increase in user costs by just over one percent of income each year.  In 
one quarter of metropolitan areas, the lump sum transfer exceeds the rise in user costs by at least 3.5 
                                                                 
22Those areas are Barnstable-Yarmouth (MA), Honolulu, Los Angeles-Riverside-Orange County, New York-
Northern New Jersey, Non-MSA Hawaii, Non-MSA Massachusetts, Salinas (CA), San Francisco-Oakland-San Jose, 
San Luis Obispo, and Santa Barbara-Santa Maria-Lompoc. 
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percent of annual income.  However, even factoring in the lump sum savings, ‘net INCSUB’ is in excess 
of +0.027 for one quarter of the metropolitan areas.  Owners in these areas clearly would be made 
worse off if the tax subsidy were eliminated.  These results simply reflect the highly spatially skewed 
nature of the program’s benefit distribution in which large subsidies flow to a relatively few areas. 
 
IV. Do the Results Reflect Spatial Variation in Income or House Value Alone? 
 Our analysis shows that the tax subsidy to owner-occupied housing is considerably skewed 
spatially.  However, it is not yet clear precisely what drives these findings.  Given the progressivity of the 
tax code, one would expect the subsidy to be positively correlated with income, a factor that could go a 
long way toward accounting for much of what we have found so far.  Hence, a natural question to ask is 
whether the spatial subsidy distribution merely reflects the higher marginal tax rates associated with 
higher income.   
The answer is no, as the subsidy distribution is materially more regressive than the tax code is 
progressive.  For example, if we rank tracts by mean household income and concentrate on the tracts 
containing the top 10 percent of households by mean income in the tract, we find the following.  The 
households in these tracts pay 28 percent of all taxes we estimate are paid nationally,23 yet the owners in 
these tracts receive 38 percent of the nationwide subsidy.  Thus, the program appears more regressive 
than the tax code is progressive.24  
                                                                 
23The estimate of taxes paid is an output from the NBER’s TAXSIM program.  The calculation is made at the 
tract level analogously to how subsidy estimates are made.  See the discussion at the beginning of the previous 
section for the details . 
24The same conclusion is reached if one looks at the top quarter of households and so forth.  That said, it 
should be mentioned that we underestimate the progressivity of the income tax code.  In the Statistics of Income  data 
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This suggests that house value, not just income (or marginal tax rate), plays an important role in 
accounting for the spatial variance in subsidy flows.  Because these variables are so strongly correlated, 
it is difficult to establish the precise fraction of variance in subsidy across tracts that each accounts for.  
However, the subsidy distribution is not merely a reflection of the progressivity in marginal tax rates.  
High income, high tax bracket owners tend to reside in disproportionately valuable houses so that the 
tax code is interacting with housing prices to generate an extremely skewed tax subsidy distribution – 
both across the income scale and across locations within the country.25 
 
V. Conclusion 
The value of the tax subsidy to owners of homes is very large.  In aggregate, the figure was 
nearly $164 billion in 1989.  It has long been known that these benefits are skewed towards owners 
with high incomes and high house prices.  This paper produced the first detailed analysis of how this 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
for 1989, the 10 percent of tax filers with the highest adjusted gross incomes paid 55 percent of all taxes.  While there 
are several possible reasons for the discrepancy, a major one almost certainly has to do with the fact that we average 
across households within each tract.  Our highest mean income at the tract level is $225,000.  The SOI data show that 
households with incomes of $250,000 or more paid 17.5% of all taxes in 1989.  Effectively, by averaging across 
households within a tract, we reduce the observed skewness in income.  In general, the more heterogeneity in 
incomes within tracts, the greater will be our underestimate of the progressivity of the tax code.  A second likely 
contributing factor is that the Census does not collect some income items that would contribute to the skewness of 
income at the high end, such as capital gains.  The census also top codes income. 
We do not think the differences in progressivity matter much for our analysis because even if by using the 
tract as our unit of observation we reduce the apparent skewness in taxes paid and subsidies  received, we think the 
difference between the two is robust.  Consequently, our statement that the regressivity of the housing subsidy is 
greater than the progressivity of the tax code would still apply. 
25This can be shown more formally.  For example, a plot of INCSUB against the fitted values from a 
regression of INCSUB on the log of mean house value in the tract shows that high house value owners receive 
relatively large subsidy flows under the current code even relative to income.  Stated differently, those tracts with 
high average house values are predicted to have greater subsidies relative to income.  Moreover, if INCSUB then is 
plotted against the fitted values from the regression of INCSUB on the log of mean household income in the tract, we 
find that higher income tracts (which are high tax bracket tracts) have higher INSCUB ratios.  The analogous 
regressions and plots using CAPSUB indicate that high income tracts have high subsidies even relative to house 
value and that the perpetuity value of the subsidy is an increasing function of house value as house value increases. 
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program plays out spatially, both across and within states, and across and within metropolitan areas.  
Our results showed that the fact that owner-occupied housing is tax-favored relative to other assets 
leads to substantial redistribution within and across states.  The subsidy distribution was found to be 
highly skewed across metropolitan areas, too, with the bulk of them experiencing small to modest 
negative transfers on average, and a few areas receiving very large positive net transfers under the 
program.   
How the subsidy is distributed within individual metropolitan areas varies widely, too.  In many 
smaller MSAs, especially those in the interior of the country, program benefits tend to be distributed 
fairly evenly across owners.  This is not the case in most larger, more populous areas, in which benefits 
tend to be skewed towards a relatively small fraction of owners.  The spatial pattern of how these 
benefits are distributed within the metropolitan area also differs considerably across areas.  Residential 
segregation by income – in which those with the highest incomes, marginal tax rates, and house values – 
tend to live close to one another is evident in virtually all metropolitan areas.  However, benefits 
generally are much more evenly spatially distributed within some metropolitan areas (e.g., Madison and 
Terre Haute) than in others (e.g., Philadelphia). 
The implications of our findings are important whether or not the subsidy is capitalized into land 
values.  If there is substantial capitalization, eliminating the subsidy is likely to reduce house prices on the 
order of 20 percent on average in the United States.  However, there will be substantial variation in this 
fraction across metropolitan areas.  The impact is likely to be greatest – 25 percent or more – in our 
largest and most populous coastal areas.  If there is little or no capitalization, user costs of owning must 
increase.  Our calculations indicate that the increase will amount to between 3 and 5 percent of annual 
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income for the typical owner in the bulk of metropolitan areas.  However, the increase will average a 
much larger 10 percent of annual income for owners in twenty metropolitan areas, with the nation’s 
biggest among them. 
These results may help explain why the subsidy to owner-occupied housing persists even though 
most states, metropolitan areas, households, and even homeowners probably would be better off if it 
were eliminated and replaced with a lump-sum refundable credit.  Those that are worse off due to the 
program do not lose much while those that benefit comprise the major metropolitan areas in the U.S. 
and gain a substantial amount. 
Finally, the spatial distribution of this major subsidy program is not merely a reflection of a rising 
marginal tax rate structure.  While it certainly is true that the tax subsidy increases with household 
income (and tax bracket), the program itself is more regressive than the tax code is progressive – and 
possibly by a fairly wide margin, although our averaging across owners in a tract does result in an 
underestimate of the progressivity of the income tax code. 
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Table 1: The Value of Housing-Related Tax Benefits– 
Aggregate, Per Owner-Occupied Housing Unit, and Per Household 
 
 
Aggregate ($billions) 
 
Total  Untaxed Equity Return Home Mortgage Interest Local Property Tax 
$163.8   $101.7    $42.6    $19.6 
 
 
Per Owner-Occupied Housing Unit 
 
Total  Untaxed Equity Return Home Mortgage Interest Local Property  Tax 
$2802   $1739    $728    $335 
 
 
Per Household 
 
Total  Untaxed Equity Return Home Mortgage Interest Local Property Tax 
$1815   $1126    $471    $217 
Table 2:  Value of Housing-Related Tax Benefits by State,
Gross and Net of Program Costs
Owner-Occupied Housing Units Rental Households
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
Value of Tax Benefits: Value of Tax Benefits: State's Share of Value of Net Tax Benefits: Value of Program Costs to Net Transfer
Per Owner-Occupied Aggregate Aggregate Tax Benefits Per Owner-Occupied Net Tax Benefit: Renter Households by State
Housing Unit ($millions) Over Share of Owners Housing Unit Aggregate {=[5]+[6]}
State
ALABAMA $1,158 $1,229 0.41 -$657 -$696,592,352 -$797,258,715 -$1,493,851,067
ALASKA $2,015 $213 0.72 $200 $21,123,613 -$139,001,775 -$117,878,162
ARIZONA $2,002 $1,702 0.71 $187 $159,141,134 -$875,710,275 -$716,569,141
ARKANSAS $1,064 $650 0.38 -$751 -$459,278,478 -$320,394,690 -$779,673,168
CALIFORNIA $7,198 $41,465 2.56 $5,383 $31,009,129,124 -$8,238,613,515 $22,770,515,609
COLORADO $2,073 $1,648 0.74 $258 $204,831,551 -$861,085,005 -$656,253,454
CONNECTICUT $6,200 $4,981 2.21 $4,385 $3,523,096,557 -$756,985,680 $2,766,110,877
DELAWARE $2,985 $519 1.06 $1,170 $203,314,038 -$132,429,660 $70,884,378
DIST. COLUMBIA $7,535 $730 2.68 $5,720 $553,813,539 -$266,282,280 $287,531,259
FLORIDA $1,924 $6,548 0.69 $109 $369,608,671 -$3,015,105,225 -$2,645,496,554
GEORGIA $1,987 $3,049 0.71 $172 $264,254,055 -$1,486,559,415 -$1,222,305,360
HAWAII $9,181 $1,742 3.27 $7,366 $1,397,511,926 -$260,254,665 $1,137,257,261
IDAHO $1,409 $355 0.50 -$406 -$102,322,576 -$194,070,690 -$296,393,266
ILLINOIS $2,560 $6,870 0.91 $745 $1,998,726,844 -$2,632,220,085 -$633,493,241
INDIANA $1,221 $1,764 0.43 -$594 -$858,069,033 -$1,098,519,675 -$1,956,588,708
IOWA $1,247 $915 0.44 -$568 -$416,739,821 -$570,928,215 -$987,668,036
KANSAS $1,234 $779 0.44 -$581 -$366,913,385 -$536,942,340 -$903,855,725
KENTUCKY $1,220 $903 0.43 -$595 -$440,360,566 -$616,050,930 -$1,056,411,496
LOUISIANA $1,100 $1,082 0.39 -$715 -$702,989,515 -$900,043,980 -$1,603,033,495
MAINE $2,307 $756 0.82 $492 $161,198,099 -$249,103,305 -$87,905,206
MARYLAND $3,990 $4,530 1.42 $2,175 $2,469,363,795 -$1,082,994,165 $1,386,369,630
MASSACHUSETTS $4,930 $6,552 1.76 $3,115 $4,139,778,960 -$1,609,792,470 $2,529,986,490
MICHIGAN $1,804 $4,375 0.64 -$11 -$27,157,457 -$1,774,855,830 -$1,802,013,287
MINNESOTA $1,903 $2,244 0.68 $88 $104,192,831 -$831,044,940 -$726,852,109
MISSISSIPPI $945 $613 0.34 -$870 -$564,023,424 -$462,033,660 -$1,026,057,084
MISSOURI $1,470 $1,965 0.52 -$345 -$460,780,863 -$1,080,433,200 -$1,541,214,063
MONTANA $1,211 $249 0.43 -$604 -$124,091,305 -$181,723,245 -$305,814,550
NEBRASKA $1,207 $474 0.43 -$608 -$238,670,924 -$357,255,525 -$595,926,449
NEVADA $1,982 $290 0.71 $167 $24,360,718 -$140,504,595 -$116,143,877
NEW HAMPSHIRE $3,214 $901 1.15 $1,399 $392,223,842 -$237,619,800 $154,604,042
NEW JERSEY $5,482 $9,790 1.95 $3,667 $6,548,725,375 -$1,734,139,935 $4,814,585,440
NEW MEXICO $1,732 $632 0.62 -$83 -$30,215,238 -$316,336,350 -$346,551,588
NEW YORK $5,264 $17,921 1.88 $3,449 $11,742,557,228 -$4,900,327,575 $6,842,229,653
NORTH CAROLINA $1,736 $2,960 0.62 -$79 -$134,979,918 -$1,438,797,690 -$1,573,777,608
NORTH DAKOTA $942 $138 0.34 -$873 -$127,689,196 -$140,504,595 -$268,193,791
OHIO $1,512 $4,161 0.54 -$303 -$835,063,531 -$2,373,243,180 -$3,208,306,711
OKLAHOMA $1,045 $857 0.37 -$770 -$631,591,260 -$696,976,335 -$1,328,567,595
OREGON $2,026 $1,405 0.72 $211 $146,204,094 -$731,786,220 -$585,582,126
PENNSYLVANIA $1,856 $5,888 0.66 $41 $128,833,528 -$2,366,801,745 -$2,237,968,217
RHODE ISLAND $3,911 $878 1.39 $2,096 $470,692,648 -$274,074,075 $196,618,573
SOUTH CAROLINA $1,547 $1,358 0.55 -$268 -$235,119,238 -$675,493,995 -$910,613,233
SOUTH DAKOTA $775 $126 0.28 -$1,040 -$168,948,464 -$153,133,365 -$322,081,829
TENNESSEE $1,187 $1,496 0.42 -$628 -$790,659,507 -$1,060,803,975 -$1,851,463,482
TEXAS $1,334 $4,922 0.48 -$481 -$1,773,174,716 -$4,220,241,630 -$5,993,416,346
UTAH $1,658 $606 0.59 -$157 -$57,344,286 -$302,103,120 -$359,447,406
VERMONT $2,199 $320 0.78 $384 $55,834,195 -$118,459,605 -$62,625,410
VIRGINIA $3,115 $4,724 1.11 $1,300 $1,971,335,379 -$1,373,867,880 $597,467,499
WASHINGTON $2,380 $2,782 0.85 $565 $660,853,593 -$1,243,432,905 -$582,579,312
WEST VIRGINIA $936 $476 0.33 -$879 -$446,630,784 -$321,725,085 -$768,355,869
WISCONSIN $1,605 $1,946 0.57 -$210 -$254,430,783 -$1,092,557,400 -$1,346,988,183
WYOMING $1,012 $115 0.36 -$803 -$91,511,434 -$98,376,630 -$189,888,064
Table 3:  Value of Housing-Related Tax Benefits by Metropolitan Areas,
Gross and Net of Mean Program Costs
Owner-Occupied Housing Units Rental Households
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Value of Net
Value of Tax Benefits: Value of Tax Benefits: State's Share of Tax Benefits Value of Net Net Transfer
Per Owner-Occupied Aggregate Aggregate Tax Benefits Per Owner-Occupied Tax Benefit: Program Costs to by MSA
MSA Name Housing Unit ($millions) Over Share of Owners Housing Unit Aggregate Renter Households (=(6)+(7))
Abilene $884 $24 0.32 -$931 -$25,051,958 -$27,791,280 -$52,843,238
Albany $1,457 $308 0.52 -$358 -$75,665,198 -$215,077,500 -$290,742,698
Albany $2,774 $61 0.99 $959 $20,934,219 -$30,833,220 -$9,899,001
Albuquerque $2,035 $290 0.73 $220 $31,360,919 -$141,649,860 -$110,288,941
Alexandria $923 $28 0.33 -$892 -$27,148,420 -$26,684,130 -$53,832,550
Allentown $2,347 $381 0.84 $532 $86,352,011 -$113,878,545 -$27,526,534
Altoona $855 $31 0.31 -$960 -$35,030,641 -$25,056,075 -$60,086,716
Anchorage $2,403 $105 0.86 $588 $25,687,619 -$68,516,250 -$42,828,631
Anniston $973 $29 0.35 -$842 -$25,375,522 -$22,634,865 -$48,010,387
Appleton $1,589 $129 0.57 -$226 -$18,304,344 -$62,434,185 -$80,738,529
Asheville $1,608 $88 0.57 -$207 -$11,306,698 -$39,850,140 -$51,156,838
Athens $1,685 $43 0.60 -$130 -$3,361,962 -$38,497,965 -$41,859,927
Atlanta $2,802 $1,936 1.00 $987 $681,744,876 -$739,576,200 -$57,831,324
Austin $1,710 $285 0.61 -$105 -$17,569,235 -$285,405,120 -$302,974,355
Bakersield $2,028 $218 0.72 $213 $22,852,940 -$131,696,400 -$108,843,460
Bangor $1,570 $231 0.56 -$245 -$36,030,289 -$121,869,990 -$157,900,279
Barnstable $4,956 $278 1.77 $3,141 $175,892,416 -$37,951,650 $137,940,766
Baton Rouge $1,305 $160 0.47 -$510 -$62,481,387 -$112,426,545 -$174,907,932
Beaumont $810 $76 0.29 -$1,005 -$93,820,546 -$73,703,520 -$167,524,066
Bellingham $2,002 $63 0.71 $187 $5,850,503 -$31,061,910 -$25,211,407
Benton Harbor $1,451 $62 0.52 -$364 -$15,437,401 -$34,145,595 -$49,582,996
Billings $1,379 $40 0.49 -$436 -$12,801,795 -$28,147,020 -$40,948,815
Biloxi $1,141 $86 0.41 -$674 -$50,693,804 -$63,604,860 -$114,298,664
Binghamton $1,962 $134 0.70 $147 $10,045,376 -$58,339,545 -$48,294,169
Birmingham $1,543 $336 0.55 -$272 -$59,092,209 -$182,273,190 -$241,365,399
Bismarck $1,115 $23 0.40 -$700 -$14,309,997 -$18,885,075 -$33,195,072
Bloomington $1,460 $43 0.52 -$355 -$10,522,151 -$30,758,805 -$41,280,956
Bloomington $1,566 $34 0.56 -$249 -$5,346,242 -$30,586,380 -$35,932,622
Boise City $1,570 $118 0.56 -$245 -$18,373,670 -$61,042,080 -$79,415,750
Boston-Worcester-Lawrence $5,126 $5,994 1.83 $3,311 $3,871,964,038 -$1,401,214,485 $2,470,749,553
Brownsville $707 $33 0.25 -$1,108 -$52,197,963 -$47,868,810 -$100,066,773
Bryan $1,272 $23 0.45 -$543 -$9,898,774 -$43,387,575 -$53,286,349
Buffalo $1,851 $549 0.66 $36 $10,618,816 -$295,746,990 -$285,128,174
Burlington $2,677 $115 0.96 $862 $37,131,815 -$39,376,425 -$2,244,610
Canton $1,208 $127 0.43 -$607 -$63,957,511 -$78,916,200 -$142,873,711
Casper $871 $14 0.31 -$944 -$15,478,288 -$13,167,825 -$28,646,113
Cedar Rapids $1,697 $78 0.61 -$118 -$5,452,828 -$34,394,250 -$39,847,078
Champaign $1,638 $57 0.58 -$177 -$6,184,566 -$51,388,095 -$57,572,661
Charleston $1,951 $138 0.70 $136 $9,632,800 -$52,564,215 -$42,931,415
Charleston $1,199 $133 0.43 -$616 -$68,388,606 -$112,234,155 -$180,622,761
Charlotte $2,156 $634 0.77 $341 $100,315,368 -$261,897,240 -$161,581,872
Charlottesville $2,814 $81 1.00 $999 $28,870,731 -$35,757,315 -$6,886,584
Chattanooga $1,249 $139 0.45 -$566 -$62,871,837 -$88,831,545 -$151,703,382
Cheyenne $1,132 $21 0.40 -$683 -$12,533,102 -$17,912,235 -$30,445,337
Chicago-Gary-Kenosha $3,314 $5,938 1.18 $1,499 $2,686,164,724 -$1,953,442,755 $732,721,969
Chico-Paradise $2,231 $98 0.80 $416 $18,181,401 -$50,694,765 -$32,513,364
Cincinatti-Hamilton $1,858 $807 0.66 $43 $18,523,965 -$423,555,660 -$405,031,695
Clarksville-Hopkinsville $966 $32 0.34 -$849 -$27,660,391 -$40,383,750 -$68,044,141
Cleveland-Akron $1,769 $1,297 0.63 -$46 -$33,496,143 -$643,136,175 -$676,632,318
Colorado Springs $1,976 $166 0.71 $161 $13,480,812 -$108,673,125 -$95,192,313
Columbia $1,530 $164 0.55 -$285 -$30,412,320 -$100,734,315 -$131,146,635
Table 3:  Value of Housing-Related Tax Benefits by Metropolitan Areas,
Gross and Net of Mean Program Costs
Owner-Occupied Housing Units Rental Households
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Value of Net
Value of Tax Benefits: Value of Tax Benefits: State's Share of Tax Benefits Value of Net Net Transfer
Per Owner-Occupied Aggregate Aggregate Tax Benefits Per Owner-Occupied Tax Benefit: Program Costs to by MSA
MSA Name Housing Unit ($millions) Over Share of Owners Housing Unit Aggregate Renter Households (=(6)+(7))
Columbia $1,938 $44 0.69 $123 $2,806,327 -$33,947,760 -$31,141,433
Columbus $1,430 $438 0.51 -$385 -$117,985,065 -$364,664,355 -$482,649,420
Columbus $1,860 $98 0.66 $45 $2,400,091 -$68,741,310 -$66,341,219
Corpus Christi $1,022 $72 0.36 -$793 -$56,159,736 -$85,985,625 -$142,145,361
Cumberland $1,020 $29 0.36 -$795 -$22,445,446 -$20,014,005 -$42,459,451
Dallas-Fort Worth $1,949 $1,688 0.70 $134 $115,866,848 -$1,103,932,005 -$988,065,157
Danville $1,039 $30 0.37 -$776 -$22,730,529 -$23,558,700 -$46,289,229
Davenport-Moline $1,257 $116 0.45 -$558 -$51,501,340 -$78,616,725 -$130,118,065
Daytona Beach $1,346 $160 0.48 -$469 -$55,792,736 -$82,435,485 -$138,228,221
Dayton-Springfield $1,566 $374 0.56 -$249 -$59,542,734 -$224,608,065 -$284,150,799
Decatur $1,140 $37 0.41 -$675 -$21,753,323 -$25,043,370 -$46,796,693
Decatur $1,088 $40 0.39 -$727 -$26,459,138 -$23,164,845 -$49,623,983
Denver-Boulder-Greeley $2,288 $1,099 0.82 $473 $227,076,091 -$535,372,365 -$308,296,274
Des Moines $1,716 $175 0.61 -$99 -$10,116,133 -$91,492,335 -$101,608,468
Detroit-Ann Arbor-Flint $2,162 $2,865 0.77 $347 $459,758,702 -$1,050,906,780 -$591,148,078
Dothan $950 $10 0.34 -$865 -$9,234,837 -$9,595,905 -$18,830,742
Dover $2,015 $55 0.72 $200 $5,477,715 -$21,832,635 -$16,354,920
Dubuque $1,428 $31 0.51 -$387 -$8,378,864 -$15,828,615 -$24,207,479
Duluth-Superior $1,034 $72 0.37 -$781 -$54,446,440 -$44,142,615 -$98,589,055
Eau Claire $1,061 $15 0.38 -$754 -$10,676,635 -$8,949,765 -$19,626,400
El Paso $1,018 $106 0.36 -$797 -$83,280,133 -$127,349,475 -$210,629,608
Elkhart-Goshen $1,328 $54 0.47 -$487 -$19,842,540 -$28,686,075 -$48,528,615
Elmira $1,406 $34 0.50 -$409 -$9,851,996 -$20,097,495 -$29,949,491
Enid $864 $13 0.31 -$951 -$14,747,790 -$12,891,945 -$27,639,735
Erie $1,152 $80 0.41 -$663 -$46,116,660 -$55,987,305 -$102,103,965
Eugene-Springfield $1,880 $127 0.67 $65 $4,406,791 -$78,999,690 -$74,592,899
Evansville-Springfield $1,224 $92 0.44 -$591 -$44,231,860 -$61,209,060 -$105,440,920
Fargo-Moorhead $1,360 $46 0.49 -$455 -$15,287,821 -$42,438,330 -$57,726,151
Fayetteville $1,455 $77 0.52 -$360 -$19,018,046 -$69,690,555 -$88,708,601
Fayetteville-Springdale $1,325 $71 0.47 -$490 -$26,296,848 -$48,585,735 -$74,882,583
Florence $1,040 $39 0.37 -$775 -$29,289,063 -$23,531,475 -$52,820,538
Florence $1,260 $36 0.45 -$555 -$15,711,877 -$21,072,150 -$36,784,027
Fort Collins-Loveland $1,966 $87 0.70 $151 $6,686,517 -$47,346,090 -$40,659,573
Fort Myers-Cape Coral $2,125 $210 0.76 $310 $30,600,876 -$69,042,600 -$38,441,724
Fort Pierce $2,403 $166 0.86 $588 $40,618,127 -$46,275,240 -$5,657,114
Fort Smith $1,033 $48 0.37 -$782 -$36,089,661 -$37,261,950 -$73,351,611
Fort Walton Beach $1,410 $47 0.50 -$405 -$13,410,402 -$36,109,425 -$49,519,827
Fort Wayne $1,280 $158 0.46 -$535 -$66,095,387 -$81,680,445 -$147,775,832
Fresno $2,162 $298 0.77 $347 $47,910,056 -$200,771,670 -$152,861,614
Gadsden $871 $25 0.31 -$944 -$26,983,637 -$17,661,765 -$44,645,402
Gainesville $1,267 $48 0.45 -$548 -$20,853,720 -$56,811,315 -$77,665,035
Glens Falls $2,315 $71 0.83 $500 $15,304,109 -$22,219,230 -$6,915,121
Goldsboro $1,293 $30 0.46 -$522 -$12,067,976 -$24,778,380 -$36,846,356
Grand Forks $1,144 $24 0.41 -$671 -$14,168,120 -$27,128,805 -$41,296,925
Grand Rapids-Meskegon $1,719 $422 0.61 -$96 -$23,585,453 -$159,970,470 -$183,555,923
Great Falls $1,283 $25 0.46 -$532 -$10,203,126 -$19,095,615 -$29,298,741
Green Bay $1,581 $75 0.56 -$234 -$11,091,696 -$44,364,045 -$55,455,741
Greensboro-Winston-Salem $1,900 $532 0.68 $85 $23,703,722 -$241,171,755 -$217,468,033
Greenville $1,644 $39 0.59 -$171 -$3,997,490 -$30,531,930 -$34,529,420
Greenville-Spartenburg $1,457 $319 0.52 -$358 -$78,291,175 -$170,123,580 -$248,414,755
Harrisburg-Lebanon-Carlisle $1,620 $252 0.58 -$195 -$30,330,144 -$128,071,845 -$158,401,989
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Hartford $5,177 $1,199 1.85 $3,362 $778,660,887 -$236,309,370 $542,351,517
Hickory-Morganton $1,434 $120 0.51 -$381 -$31,772,759 -$51,034,170 -$82,806,929
Honolulu $10,590 $1,440 3.78 $8,775 $1,193,279,612 -$193,680,465 $999,599,147
Houma $897 $40 0.32 -$918 -$41,344,986 -$28,825,830 -$70,170,816
Houston-Galveston $1,666 $1,252 0.59 -$149 -$111,768,348 -$1,044,625,065 -$1,156,393,413
Huntington-Ashland $950 $82 0.34 -$865 -$74,435,002 -$60,742,605 -$135,177,607
Huntsville $1,698 $126 0.61 -$117 -$8,688,656 -$66,120,450 -$74,809,106
Indianapolis $1,582 $542 0.56 -$233 -$79,658,793 -$338,272,440 -$417,931,233
Iowa City $2,230 $42 0.80 $415 $7,782,466 -$30,410,325 -$22,627,859
Jackson $1,288 $118 0.46 -$527 -$48,466,169 -$85,923,915 -$134,390,084
Jackson $1,430 $57 0.51 -$385 -$15,206,129 -$26,065,215 -$41,271,344
Jackson $1,008 $20 0.36 -$807 -$15,615,639 -$18,463,995 -$34,079,634
Jacksonville $1,456 $324 0.52 -$359 -$79,879,711 -$217,780,035 -$297,659,746
Jacksonville $1,302 $28 0.46 -$513 -$11,118,745 -$28,479,165 -$39,597,910
Jamestown $1,211 $45 0.43 -$604 -$22,246,310 -$30,577,305 -$52,823,615
Janesville-Beloit $1,306 $46 0.47 -$509 -$18,095,455 -$30,207,045 -$48,302,500
Johnston City-Kingsport $948 $119 0.34 -$867 -$108,735,490 -$81,330,150 -$190,065,640
Johnstown $793 $54 0.28 -$1,022 -$69,718,955 -$42,363,915 -$112,082,870
Joplin $899 $34 0.32 -$916 -$34,707,072 -$27,284,895 -$61,991,967
Kalamazoo-Battle Creek $1,441 $159 0.51 -$374 -$41,120,698 -$92,071,320 -$133,192,018
Kansas City $1,670 $664 0.60 -$145 -$57,467,297 -$369,499,515 -$426,966,812
Killeen-Temple $994 $35 0.35 -$821 -$28,756,957 -$59,023,800 -$87,780,757
Knoxville $1,260 $199 0.45 -$555 -$87,569,379 -$130,676,370 -$218,245,749
Kokomo $1,089 $29 0.39 -$726 -$19,084,117 -$16,590,915 -$35,675,032
La Crosse $1,380 $39 0.49 -$435 -$12,383,648 -$27,036,240 -$39,419,888
Lafayette $927 $76 0.33 -$888 -$72,651,535 -$71,313,165 -$143,964,700
Lafayette $1,385 $44 0.49 -$430 -$13,743,575 -$38,704,875 -$52,448,450
Lake Charles $1,045 $44 0.37 -$770 -$32,635,727 -$32,234,400 -$64,870,127
Lakeland-Winter Haven $1,120 $122 0.40 -$695 -$75,466,553 -$82,609,725 -$158,076,278
Lancaster $1,987 $208 0.71 $172 $17,992,778 -$84,161,550 -$66,168,772
Lansing-E. Lansing $1,737 $176 0.62 -$78 -$7,866,887 -$97,706,895 -$105,573,782
Laredo $857 $18 0.31 -$958 -$19,988,044 -$24,707,595 -$44,695,639
Las Cruces $1,504 $44 0.54 -$311 -$9,034,672 -$27,820,320 -$36,854,992
Las Vegas $1,853 $332 0.66 $38 $6,859,282 -$264,187,770 -$257,328,488
Lawrence $1,462 $23 0.52 -$353 -$5,558,004 -$25,876,455 -$31,434,459
Lawton $1,069 $24 0.38 -$746 -$16,860,907 -$27,199,590 -$44,060,497
Lewiston-Auburn $1,918 $48 0.68 $103 $2,570,673 -$27,716,865 -$25,146,192
Lexington $1,758 $139 0.63 -$57 -$4,506,148 -$106,705,665 -$111,211,813
Lima $1,159 $47 0.41 -$656 -$26,564,622 -$26,912,820 -$53,477,442
Lincoln $1,586 $79 0.57 -$229 -$11,448,458 -$58,862,265 -$70,310,723
Little Rock $1,497 $188 0.53 -$318 -$39,947,920 -$122,648,625 -$162,596,545
Longview $856 $43 0.31 -$959 -$47,910,435 -$40,394,640 -$88,305,075
Los Angeles-Riverside-Orange Cnty $7,915 $20,891 2.82 $6,100 $16,100,318,671 -$4,022,201,535 $12,078,117,136
Louisville $1,451 $346 0.52 -$364 -$86,777,700 -$209,369,325 -$296,147,025
Lubbock $1,038 $49 0.37 -$777 -$36,877,400 -$61,552,095 -$98,429,495
Lynchburg $1,477 $78 0.53 -$338 -$17,778,536 -$35,858,955 -$53,637,491
Macon $1,484 $100 0.53 -$331 -$22,221,857 -$70,162,455 -$92,384,312
Madison $2,195 $172 0.78 $380 $29,707,640 -$109,566,105 -$79,858,465
Mansfield $1,015 $47 0.36 -$800 -$37,272,255 -$35,200,110 -$72,472,365
McAllen-Edinburg $625 $45 0.22 -$1,190 -$86,492,512 -$55,789,470 -$142,281,982
Medford-Ashland $2,217 $84 0.79 $402 $15,184,204 -$35,330,790 -$20,146,586
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Melbourne-Titusville-Palm Bay $1,706 $190 0.61 -$109 -$12,109,131 -$89,112,870 -$101,222,001
Memphis $1,544 $348 0.55 -$271 -$61,147,305 -$250,266,720 -$311,414,025
Merced $2,186 $66 0.78 $371 $11,149,906 -$46,202,640 -$35,052,734
Miami-Fort Lauderdale $2,470 $1,801 0.88 $655 $477,691,890 -$868,905,840 -$391,213,950
Milwaukee-Racine $2,115 $767 0.75 $300 $108,806,037 -$429,198,495 -$320,392,458
Minneapolis-St. Paul $2,528 $1,669 0.90 $713 $470,607,766 -$534,484,830 -$63,877,064
Mobile $1,232 $148 0.44 -$583 -$70,191,428 -$96,142,365 -$166,333,793
Modesto $3,299 $251 1.18 $1,484 $112,727,000 -$89,813,460 $22,913,540
Monroe $1,013 $33 0.36 -$802 -$26,248,057 -$32,238,030 -$58,486,087
Montgomery $1,389 $98 0.50 -$426 -$30,114,558 -$62,094,780 -$92,209,338
Muncie $912 $27 0.33 -$903 -$27,132,452 -$26,408,250 -$53,540,702
Myrtle Beach $1,824 $70 0.65 $9 $343,197 -$31,419,465 -$31,076,268
Naples $4,495 $194 1.60 $2,680 $115,881,504 -$32,737,155 $83,144,349
Nashville $1,811 $430 0.65 -$4 -$938,403 -$249,587,910 -$250,526,313
New London-Norwich $3,934 $335 1.40 $2,119 $180,648,695 -$81,811,125 $98,837,570
New Orleans $1,496 $411 0.53 -$319 -$87,799,038 -$338,807,865 -$426,606,903
New York-N. New Jersey $7,260 $26,330 2.59 $5,445 $19,747,904,428 -$5,314,732,005 $14,433,172,423
Non-MSA Alabama $832 $323 0.30 -$983 -$382,284,233 -$245,289,990 -$627,574,223
Non-MSA Alaska $1,741 $108 0.62 -$74 -$4,564,040 -$70,485,525 -$75,049,565
Non-MSA Arizona $1,422 $183 0.51 -$393 -$50,541,021 -$101,757,975 -$152,298,996
Non-MSA Arkansas $872 $309 0.31 -$943 -$334,597,205 -$245,388,000 -$579,985,205
Non-MSA California $2,587 $578 0.92 $772 $172,315,684 -$221,705,880 -$49,390,196
Non-MSA Colorado $1,701 $263 0.61 -$114 -$17,702,574 -$141,980,190 -$159,682,764
Non-MSA Delaware $2,248 $77 0.80 $433 $14,867,452 -$16,487,460 -$1,620,008
Non-MSA Florida $1,314 $353 0.47 -$501 -$134,594,074 -$148,884,450 -$283,478,524
Non-MSA Georgia $1,186 $635 0.42 -$629 -$336,671,853 -$404,441,895 -$741,113,748
Non-MSA Hawaii $5,615 $302 2.00 $3,800 $204,232,075 -$66,574,200 $137,657,875
Non-MSA Idaho $1,341 $238 0.48 -$474 -$83,948,837 -$133,028,610 -$216,977,447
Non-MSA Illinois $870 $448 0.31 -$945 -$486,519,413 -$347,686,845 -$834,206,258
Non-MSA Indiana $990 $475 0.35 -$825 -$395,569,749 -$273,598,545 -$669,168,294
Non-MSA Iowa $1,012 $434 0.36 -$803 -$344,465,741 -$298,405,965 -$642,871,706
Non-MSA Kansas $782 $234 0.28 -$1,033 -$309,508,483 -$223,653,375 -$533,161,858
Non-MSA Kentucky $834 $270 0.30 -$981 -$317,682,391 -$209,196,900 -$526,879,291
Non-MSA Louisiana $724 $189 0.26 -$1,091 -$285,252,100 -$173,900,595 -$459,152,695
Non-MSA Maine $1,774 $266 0.63 -$41 -$6,129,153 -$94,788,375 -$100,917,528
Non-MSA Maryland $2,489 $220 0.89 $674 $59,590,058 -$66,986,205 -$7,396,147
Non-MSA Massachusetts $8,523 $44 3.04 $6,708 $34,954,174 -$4,530,240 $30,423,934
Non-MSA Michigan $1,100 $497 0.39 -$715 -$322,766,670 -$243,233,595 -$566,000,265
Non-MSA Minnesota $1,061 $414 0.38 -$754 -$294,469,298 -$211,062,720 -$505,532,018
Non-MSA Mississippi $796 $368 0.28 -$1,019 -$471,625,151 -$304,651,380 -$776,276,531
Non-MSA Missouri $804 $350 0.29 -$1,011 -$440,327,305 -$296,434,875 -$736,762,180
Non-MSA Montana $1,171 $184 0.42 -$644 -$101,086,272 -$134,480,610 -$235,566,882
Non-MSA Nebraska $856 $176 0.31 -$959 -$197,298,585 -$159,019,410 -$356,317,995
Non-MSA Nevada $1,700 $78 0.61 -$115 -$5,290,314 -$43,258,710 -$48,549,024
Non-MSA New Hampshire $2,491 $202 0.89 $676 $54,774,594 -$61,775,340 -$7,000,746
Non-MSA New Jersey $4,845 $377 1.73 $3,030 $235,553,922 -$70,712,400 $164,841,522
Non-MSA New Mexico $1,121 $182 0.40 -$694 -$112,741,574 -$121,501,545 -$234,243,119
Non-MSA New York $1,820 $664 0.65 $5 $1,994,184 -$292,167,810 -$290,173,626
Non-MSA North Carolina $1,332 $828 0.48 -$483 -$300,190,607 -$405,933,825 -$706,124,432
Non-MSA North Dakota $748 $69 0.27 -$1,067 -$97,993,655 -$67,292,940 -$165,286,595
Non-MSA Ohio $1,036 $558 0.37 -$779 -$419,637,185 -$345,405,390 -$765,042,575
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Non-MSA Oklahoma $756 $268 0.27 -$1,059 -$376,115,788 -$240,576,435 -$616,692,223
Non-MSA Oregon $1,647 $362 0.59 -$168 -$36,904,292 -$206,276,565 -$243,180,857
Non-MSA Pennsylvania $1,027 $556 0.37 -$788 -$426,924,580 -$318,376,410 -$745,300,990
Non-MSA South Carolina $1,299 $365 0.46 -$516 -$145,128,404 -$172,247,130 -$317,375,534
Non-MSA South Dakota $628 $69 0.22 -$1,187 -$130,732,345 -$98,158,830 -$228,891,175
Non-MSA Tennessee $711 $317 0.25 -$1,104 -$491,206,555 -$271,028,505 -$762,235,060
Non-MSA Texas $739 $588 0.26 -$1,076 -$855,566,502 -$559,829,490 -$1,415,395,992
Non-MSA Utah $1,331 $117 0.48 -$484 -$42,465,536 -$57,156,165 -$99,621,701
Non-MSA Vermont $1,998 $204 0.71 $183 $18,702,462 -$79,083,180 -$60,380,718
Non-MSA Virginia $1,330 $517 0.47 -$485 -$188,360,114 -$252,793,200 -$441,153,314
Non-MSA Washington $1,207 $257 0.43 -$608 -$129,520,837 -$190,506,030 -$320,026,867
Non-MSA West Virginia $798 $238 0.28 -$1,017 -$303,916,576 -$172,826,115 -$476,742,691
Non-MSA Wisconsin $1,172 $524 0.42 -$643 -$287,633,919 -$293,643,405 -$581,277,324
Non-MSA Wyoming $1,014 $80 0.36 -$801 -$63,500,031 -$67,296,570 -$130,796,601
Norfolk-Virginia Beach-Newport News $2,302 $701 0.82 $487 $148,190,351 -$360,344,655 -$212,154,304
Ocala $1,068 $63 0.38 -$747 -$44,148,682 -$35,294,490 -$79,443,172
Odessa-Midland $1,021 $54 0.36 -$794 -$42,329,875 -$50,304,540 -$92,634,415
Oklahoma City $1,262 $298 0.45 -$553 -$130,654,561 -$239,048,205 -$369,702,766
Omaha $1,560 $242 0.56 -$255 -$39,429,462 -$152,167,785 -$191,597,247
Orlando $1,804 $534 0.64 -$11 -$3,293,191 -$297,313,335 -$300,606,526
Owensboro $1,135 $26 0.41 -$680 -$15,452,341 -$18,807,030 -$34,259,371
Panama City $1,137 $36 0.41 -$678 -$21,729,165 -$28,112,535 -$49,841,700
Parkersburg-Marietta $1,014 $43 0.36 -$801 -$34,064,795 -$27,201,405 -$61,266,200
Pensacola $1,110 $96 0.40 -$705 -$60,818,023 -$76,113,840 -$136,931,863
Peoria-Pekin $1,262 $110 0.45 -$553 -$48,409,973 -$74,905,050 -$123,315,023
Philadelphia-Wilmington-Atlantic City $3,002 $4,492 1.07 $1,187 $1,776,155,080 -$1,181,859,030 $594,296,050
Phoenix-Mesa $2,233 $1,151 0.80 $418 $215,216,850 -$553,743,795 -$338,526,945
Pine Bluff $1,009 $20 0.36 -$806 -$16,107,096 -$17,563,755 -$33,670,851
Pittsburg $1,319 $873 0.47 -$496 -$328,672,314 -$509,076,645 -$837,748,959
Pittsfield $2,970 $105 1.06 $1,155 $40,893,753 -$34,699,170 $6,194,583
Portland $3,486 $366 1.24 $1,671 $175,484,270 -$93,316,410 $82,167,860
Portland-Salem $2,150 $915 0.77 $335 $142,691,190 -$468,658,410 -$325,967,220
Providence-Fall River-Warwick $3,745 $1,256 1.34 $1,930 $647,241,284 -$412,039,485 $235,201,799
Provo-Orem $1,613 $71 0.58 -$202 -$8,879,228 -$44,149,875 -$53,029,103
Pueblo $1,036 $33 0.37 -$779 -$24,709,472 -$27,713,235 -$52,422,707
Punta Gorda $1,594 $61 0.57 -$221 -$8,442,007 -$18,137,295 -$26,579,302
Raleigh-Durham-Chapel Hill $2,506 $508 0.89 $691 $140,003,988 -$235,877,400 -$95,873,412
Rapid City $1,010 $19 0.36 -$805 -$14,950,384 -$20,072,085 -$35,022,469
Reading $1,834 $173 0.65 $19 $1,820,765 -$60,766,200 -$58,945,435
Redding $2,130 $77 0.76 $315 $11,356,763 -$35,953,335 -$24,596,572
Reno $2,547 $140 0.91 $732 $40,329,523 -$84,319,455 -$43,989,932
Richland-Kennewick-Pasco $1,176 $40 0.42 -$639 -$21,605,698 -$37,536,015 -$59,141,713
Richmond-Petersburg $2,264 $487 0.81 $449 $96,717,765 -$206,427,210 -$109,709,445
Roanoke $1,734 $105 0.62 -$81 -$4,906,663 -$52,408,125 -$57,314,788
Rochester $2,045 $550 0.73 $230 $61,946,145 -$229,205,460 -$167,259,315
Rochester $2,380 $69 0.85 $565 $16,375,056 -$20,206,395 -$3,831,339
Rockford $1,395 $119 0.50 -$420 -$35,860,185 -$70,383,885 -$106,244,070
Rocky Mount $1,319 $41 0.47 -$496 -$15,434,692 -$32,909,580 -$48,344,272
Sacramento-Yolo $4,201 $1,378 1.50 $2,386 $782,689,245 -$406,774,170 $375,915,075
Saginaw-Bay City-Midland $1,308 $143 0.47 -$507 -$55,291,972 -$70,755,960 -$126,047,932
Salinas $7,317 $418 2.61 $5,502 $314,526,845 -$97,681,485 $216,845,360
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Salt Lake City-Ogden $1,789 $418 0.64 -$26 -$5,999,770 -$200,797,080 -$206,796,850
San Angelo $914 $20 0.33 -$901 -$19,849,818 -$24,656,775 -$44,506,593
San Antonio $1,243 $339 0.44 -$572 -$156,096,855 -$332,553,375 -$488,650,230
San Francisco-Oakland-San Jose $8,799 $15,754 3.14 $6,984 $12,504,466,766 -$2,509,233,870 $9,995,232,896
San Luis Obispo $6,963 $333 2.49 $5,148 $246,060,896 -$58,116,300 $187,944,596
Santa Barbara-Santa Maria-Lompoc $9,123 $644 3.26 $7,308 $516,112,847 -$102,828,825 $413,284,022
Santa Fe $3,768 $116 1.34 $1,953 $60,199,941 -$25,364,625 $34,835,316
Sarasota-Bradenton $2,155 $340 0.77 $340 $53,720,397 -$102,687,255 -$48,966,858
Savannah $1,782 $104 0.64 -$33 -$1,944,056 -$62,849,820 -$64,793,876
Scranton-Wilkes Barre-Hazleton $1,294 $220 0.46 -$521 -$88,597,909 -$134,556,840 -$223,154,749
Seattle-Tacoma-Bremerton $3,131 $2,199 1.12 $1,316 $924,043,960 -$794,077,020 $129,966,940
Sharon $1,485 $40 0.53 -$330 -$8,953,940 -$20,934,210 -$29,888,150
Sherman-Denison $882 $22 0.31 -$933 -$23,807,956 -$20,302,590 -$44,110,546
Shreveport-Bossier City $1,083 $100 0.39 -$732 -$67,427,792 -$83,613,420 -$151,041,212
Sioux City $1,143 $33 0.41 -$672 -$19,632,831 -$24,587,805 -$44,220,636
Sioux Falls $1,125 $38 0.40 -$690 -$23,265,726 -$34,902,450 -$58,168,176
South Bend $1,199 $79 0.43 -$616 -$40,748,524 -$44,295,075 -$85,043,599
Spokane $1,132 $102 0.40 -$683 -$61,554,803 -$88,483,065 -$150,037,868
Springfield $1,461 $99 0.52 -$354 -$23,903,029 -$62,062,110 -$85,965,139
Springfield $1,269 $65 0.45 -$546 -$27,770,359 -$45,012,000 -$72,782,359
Springfiled $2,982 $452 1.06 $1,167 $176,976,021 -$169,275,975 $7,700,046
St. Cloud $1,343 $48 0.48 -$472 -$16,835,971 -$26,548,005 -$43,383,976
St. Joseph $967 $25 0.35 -$848 -$22,299,506 -$20,168,280 -$42,467,786
St. Louis $1,937 $1,263 0.69 $122 $79,249,328 -$516,986,415 -$437,737,087
State College $1,564 $40 0.56 -$251 -$6,392,614 -$28,165,170 -$34,557,784
Steubenville-Weirton $863 $36 0.31 -$952 -$39,595,640 -$24,498,870 -$64,094,510
Stockton-Lodi $3,432 $312 1.23 $1,617 $146,893,172 -$122,303,775 $24,589,397
Sumter $1,105 $24 0.39 -$710 -$15,139,745 -$20,807,160 -$35,946,905
Syracuse $2,007 $365 0.72 $192 $34,951,582 -$160,887,045 -$125,935,463
Tallahassee $1,366 $72 0.49 -$449 -$23,671,519 -$64,608,555 -$88,280,074
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater $1,544 $915 0.55 -$271 -$160,457,939 -$480,906,030 -$641,363,969
Terre Haute $825 $33 0.29 -$990 -$39,905,385 -$27,789,465 -$67,694,850
Texarkana $882 $28 0.31 -$933 -$29,218,973 -$24,101,385 -$53,320,358
Toledo $1,508 $232 0.54 -$307 -$47,167,322 -$138,194,100 -$185,361,422
Topeka $1,288 $55 0.46 -$527 -$22,377,642 -$38,321,910 -$60,699,552
Tucson $1,855 $289 0.66 $40 $6,173,171 -$182,227,815 -$176,054,644
Tulsa $1,360 $247 0.49 -$455 -$82,646,879 -$171,375,930 -$254,022,809
Tuscaloosa $1,238 $42 0.44 -$577 -$19,601,303 -$37,677,585 -$57,278,888
Tyler $1,176 $44 0.42 -$639 -$24,101,400 -$34,532,190 -$58,633,590
Utica-Rome $1,688 $132 0.60 -$127 -$9,940,816 -$68,770,350 -$78,711,166
Victoria $997 $17 0.36 -$818 -$13,857,954 -$16,908,540 -$30,766,494
Visalia-Tulare-Porterville $1,783 $104 0.64 -$32 -$1,843,150 -$70,554,495 -$72,397,645
Waco $992 $41 0.35 -$823 -$34,070,243 -$52,085,055 -$86,155,298
Washington D.C.-Baltimore $4,992 $7,716 1.78 $3,177 $4,910,461,641 -$1,664,095,455 $3,246,366,186
Waterloo-Cedar Falls $1,242 $39 0.44 -$573 -$18,058,459 -$28,205,100 -$46,263,559
Wausau $1,314 $41 0.47 -$501 -$15,546,322 -$19,030,275 -$34,576,597
West Palm Beach-Boca Raton $3,292 $815 1.17 $1,477 $365,762,849 -$181,227,750 $184,535,099
Wheeling $910 $41 0.32 -$905 -$41,106,775 -$30,982,050 -$72,088,825
Wichita $1,324 $161 0.47 -$491 -$59,579,616 -$118,720,965 -$178,300,581
Wichita Falls $884 $27 0.32 -$931 -$28,934,327 -$31,310,565 -$60,244,892
Williamsport $1,083 $34 0.39 -$732 -$22,918,697 -$24,794,715 -$47,713,412
Table 3:  Value of Housing-Related Tax Benefits by Metropolitan Areas,
Gross and Net of Mean Program Costs
Owner-Occupied Housing Units Rental Households
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Value of Net
Value of Tax Benefits: Value of Tax Benefits: State's Share of Tax Benefits Value of Net Net Transfer
Per Owner-Occupied Aggregate Aggregate Tax Benefits Per Owner-Occupied Tax Benefit: Program Costs to by MSA
MSA Name Housing Unit ($millions) Over Share of Owners Housing Unit Aggregate Renter Households (=(6)+(7))
Wilmington $2,019 $94 0.72 $204 $9,486,358 -$38,300,130 -$28,813,772
Yakima $958 $40 0.34 -$857 -$35,533,406 -$44,289,630 -$79,823,036
York $1,670 $160 0.60 -$145 -$13,914,273 -$59,982,120 -$73,896,393
Youngstown-Warren $1,051 $174 0.37 -$764 -$126,814,393 -$111,874,785 -$238,689,178
Yuba City $1,958 $47 0.70 $143 $3,406,116 -$31,237,965 -$27,831,849
Yuma $1,333 $31 0.48 -$482 -$11,369,507 -$19,623,780 -$30,993,287
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Figure 3: Value of Net Tax Benefits per Owner-Occupied Housing Unit
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Figure 4: Net Transfer by State
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Figure 5:  Suburban-City Benefit Gaps (SCGAP), by State
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Figure 6:  Value of Net Tax Benefits Per Owner-Occupied Housing Unit, by Metropolitan Area
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Figure 7:  Aggregate Net Transfers, by Metropolitan Area
-$4,000,000,000
-$2,000,000,000
$0
$2,000,000,000
$4,000,000,000
$6,000,000,000
$8,000,000,000
$10,000,000,000
$12,000,000,000
$14,000,000,000
$16,000,000,000
Metropolitan Area
Figure 8: Tax Benefit Value per Household by Metropolitan Area
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Figure 10: Tax Benefit Value per Household by Census Tract
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Figure 11: Tax Benefit Value per Household by Census Tract
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Figure 12: Tax Benefit Value per Household by Census Tract
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Figure 13: Tax Benefit Value per Household by Census Tract
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Figure 14: Tax Benefit Value per Household by Census Tract
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Figure 15: Tax Benefit Value per Household by Census Tract
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Figure 16:  CAPSUB Mean Values, by Metropolitan Area
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Figure 17:  INCSUB Mean Values, by Metropolitan Area
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Appendix A: Correcting for Self-Selection in Determining Itemization Status  
The SOI data set we use to help deal with self-selection problems contains information from the 
tax returns of a 96,000 observation, income-stratified sample of all tax filers in 1989.  With ideal data, 
we could assign the mean deduction for each category of taxpayer to the census data.  However, 
administrative data such as that in the SOI only reports deductions if the family actually itemized.  If the 
family had some potentially itemizable deductions, but chose to take the standard deduction instead, we 
observe none of their potential deductions.  Since only families with a lot of deductions itemize, it is 
unlikely that the mean of the observed deductions, conditional on having any, is the same as the 
unconditional mean (which is the value we wish to impute).  
There are two reasons why we might not observe any deductions in a particular category.  The 
first, which has already been mentioned, is that deductions are observed only if the taxpayer has enough 
total deductions to make itemization worthwhile.  The second is that a taxpayer may not want or have 
deductions in any one category even if his total deductions across categories are sufficient to make 
itemization worthwhile.  Each factor generates the need for a sample selection correction of its own. 
Thus, we would like to estimate the following, 
(A.1) Dij = a0  +  a1*f(AGIi) + a2*FSTATi + a3*CHILDi + e ij 
where Dij are the deductions for family i in category j, f(AGIi) is a nonlinear function of adjusted gross 
income (AGI),26 FSTAT represents the family’s tax filing status, and CHILD corresponds to whether 
the family has children.  However, we do not observe Dj.  Instead, we observe D*j which equals Dj 
under the following conditions: 
                                                                 
26We use a set of indicator variables for ranges of adjusted gross income. 
  
D*j = Dj if  SDj > standard deduction and Dj > 0 
(A.2) D*j =  0 if  SDj > standard deduction and Dj ¹ 0 
D*j is not observed otherwise ( SDj £ standard deduction). 
Our imputation problem arises for two reasons.  First, E[D*j] ¹ E[Dj].  Second, the sample of 
families for whom Dj is observed may have a different responsiveness of itemization to AGI, so that we 
would not be able to extrapolate our imputation out of the sample of itemizers.  We, therefore, adopt 
the following strategy.  The first step involves using the SOI data to estimate whether a family itemizes.  
For the entire U.S., this is done via a probit for the following model,   
(A.3)  Ik = b0 + b1*f(AGIk) + b2*FSTATk + b3*CHILDk + b4*STATEk + hk, 
where Ik = 1 if family k itemizes and zero otherwise.  The variable STATE is an indicator for the state of 
residence.  It is included because state residence affects the probability of itemizing due to differences in 
state tax rates, but it should not independently affect the likelihood of having deductions in other 
categories or the amount of those deductions. 
The second step in the imputation procedure requires constructing the inverse Mills ratio for 
each family k.  For future reference, this is labeled as 
(A.4) lˆ (Ik) = j(Xk bˆ )/F(Xk bˆ ), 
where Xk is the vector of right-hand side variables from equation (A.3).  The next step involves using a 
probit with the SOI data to estimate equation (A.5) for the entire U.S.,  
(A.5) Cjk = g0 + g1*f(AGIk) + g2*FSTATk + g3*CHILDk + g4* lˆ (Ik) + Vk, 
where Cjk=1 if family k has positive deductions in category j and lˆ (Ik) is included to correct for sample 
  
selection in the pool of itemizers. 
From equation (A.5), we can then construct lˆ (Cjk)=j(Zjk gˆ )/F(Zjk gˆ ), where Z is the vector 
of right-hand side variables in (A.5).  We estimate equation (A.6) via OLS, 
(A.6) Djk = d0  +  d1*f(AGIk) + d2*FSTATk + d3*CHILDk + d4* lˆ (Ik) + d5* lˆ (Cjk) + e jk. 
In this specification, lˆ (I) corrects for sample selection due to only observing itemizers and lˆ (C) 
corrects for the selection arising from the decision to itemize in a given category.27 
To impute to the census data, we apply the estimates from the SOI to the census data and 
construct  lIo and lCo values for each census family i.  Next, the value for Cji, the probability of having a 
deduction in category j is imputed, where j corresponds to deductible medical expenses, charitable 
giving, deductible interest expenses, or other deductible expenses.  We then pick a random number 
from the uniform distribution on the interval [0,1] for each family.  If that number is less than Cji, we 
predict the amount Dji, the amount of deductions in category j, and impute it to the family.  If the 
random number is greater than Cji, we impute zero as the amount of deductions.  
                                                                 
27It bears mentioning that the SOI only reports state of residence for families with AGI under 
$200,000.  However, more than 98 percent of families with AGI above that level itemize, whereas only 
28% of families below that threshold do.  Thus, we assume that there is no sample selection problem for 
families with AGI over $200,000 and estimate the last three steps only, leaving lˆ (Ik) out of the 
regression for these families. 
Metropolitan Area CAPSUB INCSUB Metropolitan Area CAPSUB INCSUB
Abilene 0.14 0.02 Canton 0.18 0.03
Albany 0.20 0.04 Casper 0.15 0.03
Albany 0.25 0.06 Cedar Rapids 0.24 0.04
Albuquerque 0.22 0.05 Champaign 0.18 0.04
Alexandria 0.16 0.03 Charleston 0.23 0.06
Allentown 0.21 0.05 Charleston 0.19 0.04
Altoona 0.17 0.03 Charlotte 0.24 0.05
Anchorage 0.22 0.04 Charlottesville 0.24 0.06
Anniston 0.18 0.04 Chattanooga 0.18 0.04
Appleton 0.22 0.04 Cheyenne 0.15 0.03
Asheville 0.22 0.05 Chicago-Gary-Kenosha 0.22 0.06
Athens 0.21 0.05 Chico-Paradise 0.21 0.07
Atlanta 0.25 0.05 Cincinatti-Hamilton 0.21 0.04
Austin 0.16 0.04 Clarksville-Hopkinsville 0.17 0.03
Bakersield 0.21 0.05 Cleveland-Akron 0.20 0.04
Bangor 0.22 0.05 Colorado Springs 0.20 0.05
Barnstable 0.27 0.13 Columbia 0.20 0.05
Baton Rouge 0.18 0.04 Columbia 0.23 0.05
Beaumont 0.14 0.02 Columbus 0.20 0.04
Bellingham 0.18 0.05 Columbus 0.20 0.04
Benton Harbor 0.21 0.04 Corpus Christi 0.15 0.03
Billings 0.20 0.04 Cumberland 0.19 0.04
Biloxi 0.19 0.04 Dallas-Fort Worth 0.18 0.04
Binghamton 0.22 0.05 Danville 0.20 0.04
Birmingham 0.20 0.04 Davenport-Moline 0.21 0.03
Bismarck 0.17 0.03 Daytona Beach 0.16 0.04
Bloomington 0.18 0.04 Dayton-Springfield 0.20 0.04
Bloomington 0.21 0.04 Decatur 0.20 0.03
Boise City 0.22 0.04 Decatur 0.19 0.03
Boston-Worcester-Lawrence 0.26 0.10 Denver-Boulder-Greeley 0.23 0.05
Brownsville 0.13 0.03 Des Moines 0.24 0.04
Bryan 0.15 0.04 Detroit-Ann Arbor-Flint 0.23 0.04
Buffalo 0.22 0.05 Dothan 0.19 0.03
Burlington 0.25 0.08 Dover 0.25 0.06
Appendix B:  CAPSUB and INCSUB Measures, by Metropolitan Area
Metropolitan Area CAPSUB INCSUB Metropolitan Area CAPSUB INCSUB
Appendix B:  CAPSUB and INCSUB Measures, by Metropolitan Area
Dubuque 0.23 0.04 Hartford 0.26 0.10
Duluth-Superior 0.21 0.03 Hickory-Morganton 0.23 0.04
Eau Claire 0.20 0.03 Honolulu 0.34 0.20
El Paso 0.13 0.03 Houma 0.16 0.03
Elkhart-Goshen 0.19 0.03 Houston-Galveston 0.17 0.03
Elmira 0.21 0.04 Huntington-Ashland 0.18 0.03
Enid 0.18 0.03 Huntsville 0.22 0.04
Erie 0.17 0.03 Indianapolis 0.19 0.04
Eugene-Springfield 0.24 0.06 Iowa City 0.25 0.06
Evansville-Springfield 0.18 0.03 Jackson 0.20 0.03
Fargo-Moorhead 0.20 0.04 Jackson 0.19 0.04
Fayetteville 0.21 0.04 Jackson 0.16 0.04
Fayetteville-Springdale 0.22 0.04 Jacksonville 0.16 0.03
Florence 0.18 0.03 Jacksonville 0.20 0.05
Florence 0.21 0.04 Jamestown 0.21 0.04
Fort Collins-Loveland 0.22 0.05 Janesville-Beloit 0.21 0.03
Fort Myers-Cape Coral 0.18 0.05 Johnston City-Kingsport 0.16 0.03
Fort Pierce 0.18 0.05 Johnstown 0.16 0.03
Fort Smith 0.20 0.03 Joplin 0.19 0.03
Fort Walton Beach 0.16 0.04 Kalamazoo-Battle Creek 0.22 0.04
Fort Wayne 0.19 0.03 Kansas City 0.22 0.04
Fresno 0.20 0.05 Killeen-Temple 0.14 0.03
Gadsden 0.18 0.03 Knoxville 0.16 0.04
Gainesville 0.16 0.04 Kokomo 0.18 0.03
Glens Falls 0.24 0.07 La Crosse 0.21 0.04
Goldsboro 0.20 0.04 Lafayette 0.16 0.03
Grand Forks 0.19 0.04 Lafayette 0.18 0.04
Grand Rapids-Meskegon 0.22 0.04 Lake Charles 0.17 0.03
Great Falls 0.19 0.04 Lakeland-Winter Haven 0.15 0.03
Green Bay 0.22 0.04 Lancaster 0.20 0.05
Greensboro-Winston-Salem 0.24 0.05 Lansing-E. Lansing 0.23 0.04
Greenville 0.23 0.05 Laredo 0.12 0.04
Greenville-Spartenburg 0.22 0.04 Las Cruces 0.20 0.05
Harrisburg-Lebanon-Carlisle 0.19 0.04 Las Vegas 0.18 0.05
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Lawrence 0.19 0.04 Non-MSA Alabama 0.18 0.03
Lawton 0.18 0.05 Non-MSA Alaska 0.20 0.04
Lewiston-Auburn 0.22 0.06 Non-MSA Arizona 0.20 0.05
Lexington 0.22 0.05 Non-MSA Arkansas 0.20 0.03
Lima 0.19 0.03 Non-MSA California 0.22 0.07
Lincoln 0.21 0.04 Non-MSA Colorado 0.20 0.05
Little Rock 0.22 0.04 Non-MSA Delaware 0.26 0.07
Longview 0.14 0.03 Non-MSA Florida 0.16 0.04
Los Angeles-Riverside-Orange Cnty 0.29 0.15 Non-MSA Georgia 0.21 0.04
Louisville 0.20 0.04 Non-MSA Hawaii 0.32 0.13
Lubbock 0.14 0.03 Non-MSA Idaho 0.21 0.04
Lynchburg 0.21 0.04 Non-MSA Illinois 0.18 0.03
Macon 0.21 0.04 Non-MSA Indiana 0.18 0.03
Madison 0.25 0.05 Non-MSA Iowa 0.22 0.03
Mansfield 0.18 0.03 Non-MSA Kansas 0.18 0.03
McAllen-Edinburg 0.12 0.02 Non-MSA Kentucky 0.19 0.03
Medford-Ashland 0.24 0.07 Non-MSA Louisiana 0.16 0.03
Melbourne-Titusville-Palm Bay 0.18 0.04 Non-MSA Maine 0.22 0.06
Memphis 0.17 0.04 Non-MSA Maryland 0.24 0.07
Merced 0.22 0.06 Non-MSA Massachusetts 0.31 0.21
Miami-Fort Lauderdale 0.18 0.06 Non-MSA Michigan 0.20 0.04
Milwaukee-Racine 0.22 0.04 Non-MSA Minnesota 0.21 0.04
Minneapolis-St. Paul 0.26 0.05 Non-MSA Mississippi 0.17 0.03
Mobile 0.19 0.04 Non-MSA Missouri 0.18 0.03
Modesto 0.24 0.08 Non-MSA Montana 0.19 0.04
Monroe 0.16 0.03 Non-MSA Nebraska 0.18 0.03
Montgomery 0.20 0.04 Non-MSA Nevada 0.17 0.05
Muncie 0.16 0.02 Non-MSA New Hampshire 0.21 0.07
Myrtle Beach 0.22 0.06 Non-MSA New Jersey 0.25 0.08
Naples 0.21 0.08 Non-MSA New Mexico 0.20 0.04
Nashville 0.18 0.04 Non-MSA New York 0.23 0.06
New London-Norwich 0.24 0.08 Non-MSA North Carolina 0.22 0.05
New Orleans 0.18 0.04 Non-MSA North Dakota 0.16 0.03
New York-N. New Jersey 0.28 0.13 Non-MSA Ohio 0.18 0.03
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Non-MSA Oklahoma 0.17 0.03 Pueblo 0.18 0.03
Non-MSA Oregon 0.23 0.05 Punta Gorda 0.16 0.04
Non-MSA Pennsylvania 0.17 0.03 Raleigh-Durham-Chapel Hill 0.26 0.06
Non-MSA South Carolina 0.21 0.04 Rapid City 0.14 0.03
Non-MSA South Dakota 0.13 0.02 Reading 0.20 0.04
Non-MSA Tennessee 0.14 0.03 Redding 0.21 0.06
Non-MSA Texas 0.14 0.03 Reno 0.19 0.06
Non-MSA Utah 0.20 0.04 Richland-Kennewick-Pasco 0.16 0.03
Non-MSA Vermont 0.23 0.06 Richmond-Petersburg 0.24 0.05
Non-MSA Virginia 0.21 0.04 Roanoke 0.22 0.04
Non-MSA Washington 0.15 0.04 Rochester 0.26 0.04
Non-MSA West Virginia 0.17 0.03 Rochester 0.24 0.05
Non-MSA Wisconsin 0.20 0.04 Rockford 0.19 0.03
Non-MSA Wyoming 0.15 0.03 Rocky Mount 0.22 0.04
Norfolk-Virginia Beach-Newport News 0.22 0.06 Sacramento-Yolo 0.26 0.09
Ocala 0.15 0.04 Saginaw-Bay City-Midland 0.21 0.03
Odessa-Midland 0.15 0.03 Salinas 0.28 0.15
Oklahoma City 0.19 0.03 Salt Lake City-Ogden 0.22 0.04
Omaha 0.21 0.04 San Angelo 0.14 0.03
Orlando 0.18 0.04 San Antonio 0.15 0.03
Owensboro 0.21 0.04 San Francisco-Oakland-San Jose 0.31 0.16
Panama City 0.14 0.03 San Luis Obispo 0.29 0.17
Parkersburg-Marietta 0.19 0.03 Santa Barbara-Santa Maria-Lompoc 0.29 0.17
Pensacola 0.15 0.03 Santa Fe 0.28 0.09
Peoria-Pekin 0.20 0.03 Sarasota-Bradenton 0.18 0.05
Philadelphia-Wilmington-Atlantic City 0.23 0.06 Savannah 0.22 0.05
Phoenix-Mesa 0.23 0.05 Scranton-Wilkes Barre-Hazleton 0.18 0.04
Pine Bluff 0.20 0.04 Seattle-Tacoma-Bremerton 0.20 0.07
Pittsburg 0.18 0.03 Sharon 0.22 0.04
Pittsfield 0.23 0.07 Sherman-Denison 0.15 0.03
Portland 0.27 0.08 Shreveport-Bossier City 0.17 0.03
Portland-Salem 0.25 0.05 Sioux City 0.21 0.03
Providence-Fall River-Warwick 0.24 0.09 Sioux Falls 0.15 0.03
Provo-Orem 0.21 0.05 South Bend 0.18 0.03
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Spokane 0.15 0.03 Wilmington 0.23 0.06
Springfield 0.19 0.04 Yakima 0.14 0.03
Springfield 0.19 0.04 York 0.20 0.04
Springfiled 0.23 0.07 Youngstown-Warren 0.18 0.03
St. Cloud 0.22 0.04 Yuba City 0.21 0.06
St. Joseph 0.20 0.03 Yuma 0.19 0.04
St. Louis 0.22 0.04
State College 0.19 0.05
Steubenville-Weirton 0.18 0.03
Stockton-Lodi 0.24 0.08
Sumter 0.19 0.04
Syracuse 0.23 0.05
Tallahassee 0.16 0.03
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater 0.16 0.04
Terre Haute 0.16 0.03
Texarkana 0.16 0.03
Toledo 0.20 0.03
Topeka 0.20 0.03
Tucson 0.20 0.05
Tulsa 0.19 0.04
Tuscaloosa 0.18 0.04
Tyler 0.16 0.03
Utica-Rome 0.22 0.05
Victoria 0.14 0.03
Visalia-Tulare-Porterville 0.20 0.05
Waco 0.14 0.03
Washington D.C.-Baltimore 0.28 0.08
Waterloo-Cedar Falls 0.22 0.04
Wausau 0.21 0.04
West Palm Beach-Boca Raton 0.20 0.06
Wheeling 0.18 0.03
Wichita 0.19 0.03
Wichita Falls 0.14 0.03
Williamsport 0.17 0.03
